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Executive summary and key 
findings 
 
International development agencies are focusing 
increasingly on fragile and conflict-affected 
states and the challenges they are facing in 
achieving the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). Recognizing that fragile states are 
‘different’ from more stable and less vulnerable 
(though not necessarily poorer) developing 
countries, donors are nowadays paying more 
attention than before to specific problems of 
governance, service delivery, the development of 
core state functions, and – more recently – 
conflict resolution, peace-building and violence 
mitigation in fragile and conflict-affected 
settings. However, despite the fact that many 
fragile states have large rural populations and 
(subsistence) agriculture and associated, non-
farm economic activities constitute significant 
sectors of their economies, the relationship 
between state fragility and rural development 
remains underexplored.  
 
Using Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC), Yemen, Nepal and Bolivia as 
country cases, the evidence presented in this 
study suggests that there are some particular and 
big challenges for rural development in fragile 
states. State fragility – disaggregated along the 
dimensions of state authority, legitimacy and 
capacity – affects levels of rural poverty, public 
service delivery and violence against women in a 
number of ways, making the achievement of 
rural development on the whole more difficult. 
The lack or limitations of development in rural 
areas in fragile countries, in turn, enhances the 
fragility of the state overall, creating a kind of 
vicious circle of fragility that is difficult to break. 
 
The study operationalizes the concept of state 
fragility as follows: “States are fragile when they 
suffer major authority and/or legitimacy and 
capacity deficits, diminishing their ability  
 
to provide the basic functions needed for poverty 
reduction and development and to safeguard the 
security and human rights of their populations 
[in urban and rural areas]”. The selected 
countries represent a spectrum of variation, with  
 
Afghanistan, DRC and Yemen belonging to the 
group of most fragile countries in the world in 
the study period (2007-2012) while Nepal and 
Bolivia are considered to be less fragile (in this 
order). Building on the concept of ‘integrated 
rural development system’, which acknowledges 
a shift from the government led idea of 
integrated rural development to a more 
governance inspired definition which involves 
active local citizen participation in both public 
and private sectors, the study adopts a thematic 
focus on rural poverty and service delivery and 
violence against women in rural areas in the five 
study countries. 
 
Key findings: 
 
 Extensive rural poverty is both related to 
(a) significant deficits in state authority, 
legitimacy and capacity, particularly in 
settings with violent conflict (and 
associated external interventions); and (b) 
persisting high levels of social inequality 
and ethnic cleavages in states where 
authority and capacity deficits are less 
pronounced. 
 
 Social inequalities between rural and urban 
areas are related to authority and capacity 
deficits, including the absence of strong, 
consistent and legitimate political 
leadership, and an historical urban elite 
bias. 
 
 The provision of social welfare safety nets 
by non-state, traditional and customary 
organizations, including with respect to 
basic food security in rural areas, is related 
to state authority and capacity deficits, and 
deepens existing legitimacy deficits. 
 
 Particularly in fragile settings affected by 
violent conflict, deficits in state authority 
result in increased pauperization of rural 
populations due to the disruption of rural 
livelihoods and wage-labour migration. 
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 Uncertain status of land tenure and land 
ownership in rural areas is related to, and 
compounded by, deficits in state authority 
and capacity. 
 
 Ineffective service delivery in rural areas is 
found in countries with both higher and 
lower deficits in state authority and 
capacity, and it undermines state 
legitimacy. 
 
 Higher levels of violence against women in 
rural areas are possibly related to deficits 
in state authority and capacity, particularly 
because of the absence or weakness of 
formal justice institutions and the 
prevalence of traditional and customary 
authorities. 
 
 Food insecurity in rural regions is 
significantly affected by state fragility.  
 
 Agricultural prices are subject to 
significant shocks which further 
exacerbates levels of rural food insecurity.  
 
 Livelihood diversification in the countries 
is key to household food security strategies 
either as a form of survival or as a strategy 
of accumulation and as the primary means 
of enhancing household safety nets; this 
diversification is often dependent on illicit 
economies.   
   
Supporting evidence: 
 
Unsurprisingly, higher levels of state fragility are 
correlated to armed conflict and violence. The 
cases of Afghanistan and DRC, and to a lesser 
extent Yemen, show that conflict and violence 
increase the risk of serious human rights 
violations committed by state security forces 
(and outside military forces, such as the 
International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, in 
Afghanistan), and compound the difficulties of 
governments and donors to strengthen the rule of 
law and create viable and sustainable local 
economies. While rural poverty rates are variable 
across the sample countries, they are extensive in 
all of them, with countries such as DRC and 
Yemen, for instance, showing significant 
increases in rural poverty in parts of the study 
period and prior to it, and directly as a result of 
protracted conflict in Afghanistan, DRC and 
Nepal. The observed increasing pauperization of 
rural populations, such as in Afghanistan, DRC 
and Yemen, can also partly be explained by 
armed conflict as rural livelihoods have been 
disrupted and sustained agricultural cultivation is 
difficult to undertake.  
 
Further, external military, security assistance and 
counter-narcotics interventions (as, for instance, 
in Afghanistan) as well as international 
peacekeeping/stabilization missions (as, for 
example, in DRC) can contribute to deepening 
state fragility and hindering rural development. 
The evidence suggests that this is the case 
because in complex conflict settings outside 
actors, such as ISAF and the UN Stabilization 
Mission in DRC (MONUSCO), have great 
difficulties to establish a modicum of security in 
large parts of the national territories of the 
intervention countries, rebuild effective and 
legitimate national security forces and support 
the establishment and implementation of 
comprehensive strategies for strengthening 
governance at the central, regional and local 
levels, including in rural areas.  
 
As vast rural and peri-urban areas in conflict-
affected and post-conflict states tend to remain 
outside of the control and reach of the central 
government, formal state hierarchies and 
authority are eclipsed by traditional and 
customary actors and networks. The evidence 
shows that this is the case in many areas in 
Afghanistan, DRC, Yemen and Nepal. In 
Afghanistan, for instance, the central state and 
international donors compete with local 
traditional and customary institutions (jirgas, 
shuras, maliks and mullahs), which have 
historically been in charge of exercising political 
authority, administering justice and providing 
other public services. The difficulties 
experienced by the National Solidarity Program 
(NSP) reveal that the introduction of ‘modern’ 
governance structures in rural areas in conflict 
settings in which the state has historically been 
absent or weak can lead to the ‘capture’ of those 
structures and funds by traditional authorities 
and local leaders as well as the Taliban and other 
armed groups.  
 
Another problematic case is DRC, especially in 
the eastern regions of the country, where local 
chiefs have fanned inter and intra-communal 
conflicts over land and the (illegal) exploitation 
of natural resources (e.g. in the mining sector). In 
several of the study countries, conflict and unrest 
have given rise to the lack of formalized 
enforcement of land tenure and ownership, with 
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the state either not delivering on promised land 
reforms, such as in Nepal, or where it has 
actively enabled the illegal exploitation of 
natural resources, such as in DRC.   
 
At the same time, however, traditional and 
customary authorities can also contribute to 
stability and social welfare and safety nets at the 
local level in rural areas. In effect, the evidence 
from across the study countries indicates that 
social welfare and safety nets, including in terms 
of basic food security, are likely to be primarily 
provided by the more embedded social 
organizations of tribe, ethnicity, caste and clan 
rather than by the state. Yet the evidence 
suggests that overall service delivery in the study 
countries is of poor quality, which is acutely 
apparent in the lack of functioning formal justice 
systems and the prominence of traditional and 
customary forms of arbitration and redress. The 
lack of courts and police services has serious 
implications for incidences of violence against 
women, which appears to be higher in rural 
areas.     
 
It is therefore important not to lose sight of the 
fact that a lack of consistent, legitimate and 
strong political leadership at the national level 
can enhance problems of state fragility. 
Afghanistan under President Karzai and DRC 
under President Kabila are telling examples in 
this regard. Both of them have been unable to 
exercise legitimate and strong leadership because 
of widespread charges of electoral irregularities 
and fraud, the centralization of political power in 
the executive office, very high levels of official 
corruption and impunity, and, in the case of 
Afghanistan, heavy dependence on an external 
intervention force with its priority focus on 
counter-insurgency/anti-terrorism and counter-
narcotics strategies. In both countries intricate 
patronage networks served to bolster the power 
of those in government and inhibited the 
establishment of transparent and accountable 
governance which could reduce the vulnerability 
of impoverished and marginalized sectors of the 
population and prevent the exacerbation of social 
inequalities in rural areas, which was found in all 
study countries with the possible exception of 
Bolivia.  
 
Evidence from the Andean country shows that 
the strong leadership exercised by indigenous 
President Morales and his Movement toward 
Socialism (MAS) on the basis of two resounding 
election victories and high popular approval 
ratings was key to mitigate and defuse 
entrenched conflict between the central 
government and the coca grower federations in 
the Chapare region. Relatively well resourced 
due to high revenues from hydrocarbon exports, 
the government also made consistent and 
significant efforts to address deep-seated issues 
of discrimination, marginalization, inequality 
and poverty in rural majority indigenous 
communities. This notwithstanding, indigenous 
income and educational levels in Bolivia remain 
low in comparison to the non-indigenous 
population, pointing to the fact that across the 
five study countries the persistence or 
exacerbation of social inequalities may be related 
to an historical urban elite bias which is 
correlated to greater social exclusion, weak 
institutional and geographical political 
representation and unequal patterns of resource 
allocation between urban and rural areas.  
 
 
1. Introduction and methodology 
 
This study examines the relationship between 
state fragility and development 
challenges/deficits in rural areas in a group of 
five countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East 
and Latin America. The sample of selected 
countries includes Afghanistan, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), Yemen, Nepal 
and Bolivia. For each of these countries the 
study provides empirical analyses of state 
fragility and rural development. To depict  
 
possible trends in the evolution of the 
relationship we have chosen the period 2007-
2012 as the study´s timeframe. Cross-country 
comparisons are drawn from this empirical work 
with the aim of highlighting how fragility factors 
affect  
(a) poverty, (b) public service delivery and 
(c) violence against women in rural areas.  
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The selection of the country cases is based on the 
following reasoning. To begin with, we were 
tasked to include a minimum of five countries 
located in all three developing world regions, i.e. 
Asia, Africa and Latin America. In conversations 
with our counterparts in GIZ it was decided to 
cover Afghanistan, DRC, Yemen, Nepal and 
Bolivia, as well as Tajikistan (and potentially 
Mali). After a thorough review of the existing 
data, the research team decided to limit the scope 
to the first five countries mentioned above due to 
the scarcity of available data on Tajikistan (and 
Mali). Further, the selected countries represent a 
sufficiently broad spectrum of variation, 
allowing for useful cross-country comparison. 
Afghanistan, DRC and Yemen belong to the 
group of most fragile countries in the world 
according to the Country Index for Foreign 
Policy (CIFP) fragility index (see below), Nepal 
is less fragile and ranks in a position that is close 
to Tajikistan and Mali, and Bolivia, finally, is 
significantly less fragile than all of the other four 
sample countries. In other words, the group of 
selected countries can be divided into two 
clusters: very fragile states and less fragile states.         
 
The study builds on and adapts (see below) the 
commonly used Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD)  
definition of ‘state fragility’: “States are fragile 
when state structures lack political will and/or 
capacity to provide the basic functions needed 
for poverty reduction, development and to 
safeguard the security and human rights of their 
populations” (Fabra Mata and Ziaja 2009: 5). 
Fragile states suffer from serious deficits or 
‘gaps’ with respect to three core dimensions of 
statehood: authority (control of violence), 
legitimacy (acceptance of rule) and state capacity 
(provision of public services and goods). 
 
Authority deficits include the existence of 
significant organized political violence or 
internal armed conflict, the inability of the state 
to extend its authority to significant parts of the 
national territory, and high levels of criminality 
with limited state action to control it through the 
justice system; legitimacy deficits include the 
absence of civil and political liberties, the 
exclusion of significant groups of the population 
from power and decision-making processes, a 
strong role of the military in the political 
process, and suppression of the political 
opposition and human rights violations; and 
capacity deficits include state failure or 
limitations to provide adequate (access to) health 
services, basic education, water and sanitation, 
and transport and energy infrastructure (Stewart 
and Brown 2010:10).1 
 
Due to the absence of a universal definition of 
rural development the study adopts an approach 
which adheres to the concept of an ‘integrated 
rural development system’ where the relationship 
between central state and local/municipal 
institutions in rural areas is key in terms of 
administration, knowledge, information, political 
and social authority and networks. This approach 
acknowledges a necessary shift from the 
government led idea of integrated rural 
development (IRD) to a more governance 
inspired definition which involves active local 
citizen participation in both public and private 
sectors (Nemas, 2005). Thematically, our focus 
is on rural poverty, and service delivery and 
violence against women in rural areas (see 
below). 
 
A number of indices have been developed to 
measure state fragility and provide a picture of 
how individual countries perform over time.2 Yet 
“fragility indices are limited to countries as their 
fixed unit of analysis; they cannot ‘zoom in’ (i.e. 
display changes beneath the national level) to 
monitor specific interventions” (Fabra and Ziaja 
2009:9). As fragile states cannot be considered to 
be ‘homogeneously fragile’ but often exhibit 
both some weaknesses, e.g. with respect to their 
capacity to deliver public services, and some 
strengths in other dimensions of statehood, e.g. 
with respect to their legitimacy or authority, it is 
important to disaggregate the analysis. Fragility 
is also non-homogeneous within regions and 
localities of states, and across urban/rural 
                                               
1
 It should be noted that there is inevitably some overlap 
between state authority, legitimacy and capacity deficits. For 
instance, the role of the military in the political process and 
human rights violations can be interpreted as representing 
both authority and legitimacy deficits; and state failure or 
significant state limitations to provide basic public services 
can have a negative effect on the state’s legitimacy as well as 
reflecting its capacity deficit. However, for the purpose of 
analysis in this study the three dimensions of state fragility 
are distinguished as outlined.    
2
 Among the fragility indices are the Country Indicators for 
Foreign Policy Fragility Index (Carleton University), the 
Failed States Index (Fund for Peace), the Index of State 
Weakness in the Developing World (Brookings Institution) 
and the State Fragility Index (George Mason University). 
Since the methodologies used in the construction of the 
indices and the number and types of indicators they employ 
vary, a vibrant debate has emerged about issues of the 
indices’ comparability, reliability, validity and, indeed, 
usefulness for measuring state fragility (Call 2011; Fabra 
Mata and Ziaja 2009; Graevingholt et al. 2012). 
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divides. There can be pockets of fragility in 
states not considered to be fragile, and pockets of 
relative stability in fragile ones. Disaggregation 
is therefore important in order to spell out 
relationships between fragility and rural 
(under)development/poverty in a more precise 
and meaningful way. Furthermore, in fragile 
states informal/traditional/customary forms of 
public authority and governance involving civil 
society organizations, faith based organisations, 
traditional chiefs and the private sector have to 
be taken into account. A focus on formal state 
structures and their weaknesses alone would be 
insufficient and the study therefore seeks to take 
informal forms of public authority and 
governance into account in the study countries 
where they are significant and data is available. 
 
In this study, the concept of state fragility is 
operationalized as follows: “States are fragile 
when they suffer major authority and/or 
legitimacy and capacity deficits, diminishing 
their capacity to provide the basic functions 
needed for poverty reduction and development 
and to safeguard the security and human rights of 
their populations [in urban and rural areas]”. The 
assumption is that state authority, legitimacy and 
capacity deficits in rural areas can be different 
from those in urban areas.  
 
The study presents analyses of the 
characteristics, degrees and evolution of state 
fragility for each of the selected country cases in 
the period 2007-2012, using the CIFP index 
produced by Carleton University (Canada) as a 
first, general approximation. This is followed by 
disaggregated analytical narratives for each of 
the country cases which are presented focusing 
on issues related to:  
 
 The lack of political will/capacity of the 
state with respect to extending its authority 
to significant parts of the national territory 
and the existence of significant political 
and/or criminal violence (including 
violence related to the production and 
trafficking of illicit drugs) and corruption 
(authority);  
 
 The exclusion of significant groups of the 
population from power and decision-
making processes due to, for instance, 
ineffective decentralization or lack of 
citizen participation and voice, and the 
violation of their human rights 
(legitimacy);  
 Failure to provide adequate (access to) 
health services, basic education and 
employment opportunities (capacity). 
Subsequently, we provide some evidence 
on the characteristics of state fragility in 
rural areas, using a select number of sub-
national, rural regions for illustrative 
purposes (depending on data availability), 
and a rural development profile for each of 
the study countries, disaggregated by ‘rural 
poverty’, ‘service delivery’ and ‘violence 
against women’. 
 
The empirical analyses of state fragility in 
Afghanistan, DRC, Yemen, Nepal and Bolivia 
over the period 2007-2012 are based on a wide 
range of official and non-official sources and the 
academic and grey literatures. In the elaboration 
of the individual country fragility narratives the 
research team synthesized large amounts of 
quantitative and qualitative data contained in 
CIFP and Bertelsmann Transformation Index 
(BTI) reports, including available country 
reports. This was complemented and triangulated 
with a broad array of qualitative and quantitative 
data contained in UN, World Bank and bilateral 
donor documents, scholarly articles and grey 
literature documents (see the full list of 
references at the end of the study). 
 
With respect to rural development in the sample 
countries, a focus on forms and levels of rural 
poverty informs the understanding of authority, 
legitimacy and capacity deficits in rural areas in 
the country cases. Close attention is given to the 
types of social exclusion and inequality in the 
selected study countries using World Bank 
Poverty Assessment data on the rural 
conflict/violence zones within these countries. 
All countries selected for this study have been 
covered by World Bank Poverty Assessments in 
some form. The Assessment data is 
disaggregated between rural and urban regions 
and deals with a comprehensive range of 
indicators which are useful to any analysis of 
state fragility and rural development, including 
employment and rural to urban migration rates, 
employment levels correlated to education, and 
household income and consumption measures. 
These can be used in tandem with estimates of 
food security and livelihood sustainability, which 
are also part of most Poverty Assessment 
analyses. There have, however, been difficulties 
with the chronological inconsistency of the 
Poverty Assessments, which have been 
undertaken at various points in the respective 
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countries, and where their irregularity is often 
probably indicative of state fragility itself. 
Equally, these assessments have not provided 
much in the way of process data particularly in 
terms of the sociological and institutional 
dynamics of rural development and state 
fragility.3  
 
The dynamics of service delivery, including 
health, education and agricultural extension 
services, in the selected countries are examined 
primarily in order to understand the problems of 
capacity deficit in rural areas, which are often 
marginalized in terms of basic service provision 
and technical capacity, and experience specific 
governance problems like weak accountability, 
multiple/overlapping state and non-state forms of 
public authority, corruption and the existence of 
criminal networks/markets. It is important to 
note that in fragile states a great deal of basic 
service provision is often through non-state 
systems (informal/traditional/customary 
institutions, NGOs or Faith Based Organizations, 
for example) which raises further problems of 
monitoring, evaluation and accountability, while 
also often being instrumentally key. In the areas 
of health and education, little process orientated 
information exists on the relationships between 
state fragility, rural development and service 
delivery (Batley and Mcloughlin, 2010), and 
again the study has been primarily reliant upon 
donor policy review documents rather than any 
longitudinal secondary or primary data. 
 
A highly under-researched area of rural 
development is the impact of state fragility and 
economic change on gender dynamics that 
reflect broader power relations and include 
serious forms of violence against women 
(VAW). VAW is a useful independent indicator 
of poverty and rural power relations as it is 
distinct from and not always associated with 
conflict-related violence. As such, this is a 
particularly useful area for analysis in order to 
further understand the legitimacy deficits of state 
fragility in rural areas, where the absence of civil 
and political liberties is key, particularly in terms 
of access to justice systems. Authority deficits 
are also at stake, articularly in relation to the 
reach of state authority.  
 
Some studies indicate that the incidence of 
domestic and sexual violence is higher in rural 
areas (Garcia Moreno et al 2005), and there is an 
                                               
3
 On further limitations of the study see below. 
emerging literature on the relationship between 
domestic and sexual violence in conflict areas 
(Ward et al 2006). However, further work could 
begin to synthesize these two areas and expand 
the analysis to wider dynamics of state fragility 
and rural development. For example, state 
fragility is often correlated with weakened 
livelihood opportunities for men with increased 
reporting of domestic violence against women 
(Marc et al 139: 2013). This needs to be 
disaggregated in terms of rural or urban 
prevalence. Equally, fragility has often shown a 
‘hardening’ of societal attitudes towards women, 
supporting violence, which also needs 
disaggregation (ibid: 139). In this regard the 
study deals primarily with specially 
commissioned respective government and donor 
reports on VAW.  
 
Limitations of the study 
We found that CIFP fragility data for the period 
2007-2012 were not available for all years and 
all sample countries. Particularly, for Bolivia the 
data are limited to the years 2006 and 2007 and 
for Nepal to 2007, 2008 and 2009 (with 
additional data available on Nepal’s ‘authority’ 
score in 2011). However, we believe that this is 
not a major drawback because we did have 
access to qualitative fragility data for all sample 
countries over the whole study period through 
the BTI country reports and complementary 
donor, academic and grey literature sources.  
 
It is nonetheless important to acknowledge that 
condensing large amounts of information and 
data on five countries in a multi-year timeframe 
(2007-2012) in one single study turned out to be 
a challenge. It is possible that the reader might 
find that our country narratives on state fragility 
are quite sweeping at times. This, however, is 
inevitable due to the broad scope of the study 
and the limited space and time available for 
presenting the material and carrying out the 
research. In order to mitigate this problem the 
researchers have attempted to triangulate and 
validate as much of the qualitative data and 
information contained in the CIFP and BTI 
country reports as possible by working with a 
broad range of additional academic, donor and 
grey literature sources. We also sought to 
provide as much detail as possible on the 
differences with respect to state fragility at the 
sub-national level in recognition of the fact that 
even highly fragile states contain pockets of 
stability or regions where fragility is less severe. 
Yet it was not possible to do this as 
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systematically as we would have liked. Further, 
it has to be underlined that it proved to be a big 
challenge to find disaggregated data on state 
fragility in rural areas in our sample countries, 
though for some countries there was more data 
available than for others. Formally 
disaggregating our rural fragility narratives by 
‘authority’, ‘legitimacy’ and ‘capacity’ would 
have been more consistent with the analyses of 
national-level fragility, but this turned out to be 
not feasible within the scope of this study and 
considering the mentioned problems of data 
scarcity. There is certainly a need for more micro 
level analysis of state fragility in rural areas.  
 
In terms of the disaggregated data available on 
development in rural areas in the sample 
countries this cannot be seen as strictly 
comparable in all cases. While most survey data 
in the sample countries have used consumption 
based assessments of poverty, countries such as 
DRC have used data simulations to try and 
predict longitudinal trends within the country. As 
with some of the fragility data it has also not 
been possible to find data that evenly covers the 
study period, but data for some of the period has 
been highlighted whenever possible. It has also 
become clear that both macro level data of 
poverty indicators and micro level studies of 
livelihood strategies and women’s access to 
justice are needed for all the sample countries. 
This notwithstanding, we believe that the 
empirical analysis presented in this study is 
overall sufficiently robust to allow us to draw 
comparative conclusions about the 
characteristics, degrees, trends and variations of 
state fragility in the sample countries in the study 
period and the relationship between state 
fragility and rural development. 
 
 
2. State fragility and rural 
development: the empirical 
evidence from the sample countries 
 
2.1. Afghanistan 
 
CIFP fragility scores 
 
CIFP data on state fragility in Afghanistan in the 
period 2007-2012 is limited to the years 2007, 
2008 and 2011. The available data indicates that 
Afghanistan has consistently exhibited fragility 
scores above 6.5, on an aggregate level and 
across the dimensions of ‘authority’, ‘legitimacy’ 
and ‘capacity’, with the exception of ‘capacity’ 
in 2008, when the country saw a slight, 
temporary improvement only to drop 
significantly again thereafter, however (see 
Table 1 below). CIFP considers a country which 
scores above 6.5 to ‘be performing poorly 
relative to others’ (CIFP 2006: 4). In 2011, 
Afghanistan ranked 2 out of 197 countries on the 
CIFP Global Fragility Ranking, after Somalia,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and therefore was among the group of ‘worst 
global performers’ (CIFP 2006: 4).4  
 
Table 1: CIFP Fragility Scores, Afghanistan, 
2007, 2008 and 2011 
 
Year/ 
score 
Aggregate 
fragility 
score 
Authority Legitimac
y 
Capacity 
2007 6.99 7.01 6.35 6.55 
2008 6.93 7.40 7.09 6.24 
2011 7.54 7.54 7.25 7.36 
Source: CIFP 2007a; CIFP 2008; CIFP 2012 
                                               
4
 The nominal index maximum of the CIFP index is 9. For a 
detailed overview of CIFP’s methodology see CIFP (2006), 
‘Failed and Fragile States 2006. A Briefing Note for the 
Canadian Government’ (Ottawa: Carleton University). 
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National fragility trends disaggregated by 
authority, legitimacy and capacity5  
 
Authority 
In the study period, the extremely weak authority 
of the Afghan state was put to a serious test, up 
to the point that beyond the capital Kabul and a 
few other larger urban centres (e.g. Kandahar) it 
actually did not exist or was heavily challenged 
by the Taliban insurgency and other anti-
government groups, including local militia 
commanders, warlords and Al Qaeda operatives.  
 
The state’s monopoly of the use of force was 
consistently undermined or limited by both the 
insurgents and anti-government forces and the 
presence of North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO)-led ISAF military personnel, which 
numbered some 31,000 in 2006 and expanded to 
approximately 150,000 by 2010. Despite the 
steady military build-up in Afghanistan, 
including the internationally-supported growth of 
the Afghan security forces from 36,000 army 
troops in 2006 to 134,000 by 2010, violence in 
the country worsened and insecurity increased. 
The number of casualties among Afghan and 
ISAF forces reached a peak in 2010 when 711 
foreign soldiers were killed; civilian casualties 
also rose from an estimated (likely 
underestimated) 1,500 in 2007 to an average of 
2,000 per year in 2008-2010. In this escalation 
of warfare, regions of the country that 
previously had been relatively peaceful, 
including in the north and west, became 
increasingly affected and destabilized by 
violence. The Taliban insurgency not only 
attacked Afghan and ISAF forces and 
institutions of the state but also started 
targeting traditional governance structures in 
rural areas, such as tribal elders. 
 
The government of President Hamid Karzai, 
elected in 2004 and re-elected among massive 
charges of electoral fraud and vote-rigging in 
2009, proved on the whole unable to set and 
maintain strategic reform and policy priorities. 
Propped up by major external support6 and 
compelled to constantly bargain and negotiate 
with local militia commanders and warlords, 
the government’s capacity to provide security 
                                               
5
 Based on CIFP Afghanistan country reports 2007b, 2008; 
BTI 2008, 2010, 2012; Afghanistan Research and Evaluation 
Unit (AREU) reports and other sources cited in the text. 
6
 In 2006-2007, for instance, international aid accounted for 
90 per cent of Afghanistan’s national budget. 
was severely limited in many parts of 
Afghanistan, though some progress was 
achieved in some areas (including in the 
notoriously insecure Helmand province). 
Though the road infrastructure between 
provincial centres and between them and 
Kabul was improved with international 
assistance large swaths of the vast rural 
hinterland were not well integrated and 
security problems along the roads persisted.  
 
Further, the government’s will to govern was 
seriously compromised by the influence 
exerted by drug-traffickers on the country’s 
political affairs, including at cabinet level. In 
the study period, the illicit opium industry and 
drug-trafficking overall increased (though 
there were periods when opium poppy 
cultivation in some provinces temporarily 
decreased; see below) and drug-related 
corruption pervaded all levels of the state 
(from the district to the central government). 
Revenues from illicit drugs and drug-
trafficking accounted approximately for more 
than half of Afghanistan’s GDP in the period 
2006-2010.  
 
Afghanistan’s formal justice system was 
basically non-operational due to corruption, 
understaffing and administrative weaknesses. 
The US and its international allies enjoyed 
judicial impunity for engaging in extrajudicial 
activities, such as killings of civilians in raids 
or air and drone strikes (UN Human Rights 
Council 2009), adding to a loss of trust in the 
justice system on the part of common 
Afghans. For the most part, Afghans viewed 
traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, 
such as those provided by community or tribal 
councils (jirga and shura) more positively than 
the formal courts because they delivered 
justice more cheaply and quickly than the 
formal system. These traditional institutions 
are of particular importance in rural areas, 
where some 80 per cent of the population 
lives. Yet there have been reports that in some 
rural areas people also turned to the Taliban to 
resolve disputes and punish wrongdoers. There 
was a degree of cooperation between 
traditional or customary justice mechanisms 
with the country’s ailing formal justice 
system, but it tended to be tenuous. 
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Legitimacy 
The legitimacy of the Karzai government and 
the extremely fragile Afghan state was 
consistently in question during the study 
period, not least because of massive charges of 
electoral fraud and election rigging in the 2009 
presidential polls mentioned earlier and 
because the country’s transitional justice 
process failed to produce the expected results. 
The legitimacy of the international community 
and ISAF did not fare much better, though 
some development interventions such as the 
NSP were received more positively by 
Afghans.7  
 
Despite large security and development 
efforts, including in rural areas, supported by 
international assistance, the central 
government could on the whole not provide 
security and basic public services to large 
numbers of citizens and reduce high poverty 
rates.8 This resulted in the loss of public 
confidence in the state. At the same time, the 
Taliban insurgents, who established parallel 
government structures including, for instance, 
local defence councils, were quite successful 
at (re-)building a popular base, especially in 
southern and south-eastern parts of the 
country. They portrayed ISAF as an 
illegitimate external occupation force and the 
Karzai government as a puppet of the US-led 
international alliance. Providing certain 
services to people in remote regions (see 
above) and selectively protecting opium poppy 
farmers against government eradication efforts 
and opium poppy bans helped the Taliban to 
increase both their legitimacy and resource 
base by collecting ‘taxes’ and other payments 
from poppy farmers. Actions by the 
international forces and donors that were 
‘above the law’, in turn, discredited them in 
the eyes of common citizens.  
 
In addition, deepening ethnic cleavages 
undermined the legitimacy of the central 
government/state. Pashtuns, the largest ethnic 
group, felt marginalized and discriminated 
against by the Karzai administration, 
contending that non-Pashtun groups, 
                                               
7
 See sections on ‘capacity’ and ‘state fragility in rural areas’ 
below for more information on the NSP. 
8
 See the section on ‘rural development’ below for more 
information on public services. 
especially Tajiks and Uzbeks, were being 
privileged.  
 
Capacity 
Afghanistan’s state is highly centralized 
(Biddle et al 2010), dependent on international 
assistance and essentially ‘structured and 
resourced to maintain control, not provide 
services’ (Rubin 2009:17). In the study period, 
its capacity to provide public goods, such as 
security, and services, such as education, 
health and social safety nets, to any 
satisfactory degree beyond Kabul and a few 
other larger urban centres (e.g. Kandahar) was 
severely limited. The state institutions for 
basic administrative matters formally operated 
but were on the whole ineffective due to the 
spiralling violence, weak governance, 
pervasive corruption and the lack of fiscal 
decentralization which made service delivery 
at the local and regional levels so much more 
difficult and volatile. Thiswas compounded by 
international donors who often focused on the 
national level and sidelined local 
administrative structures by implementing 
projects with their own staff.   
 
Afghanistan’s 34 provinces are subdivided 
into 398 administrative districts. In the study 
period, they were poorly resourced and had 
very low administrative capacity. While not 
the case throughout the country (such as in 
Balkh province, for instance), many 
governors’ offices at the provincial level de 
facto had a modest role only in decision-
making with respect to administrative 
structures, recruitment of senior staff and the 
composition of the workforce. At the 
provincial level, line ministries were unable to 
provide public services of a sufficient level of 
quality or reliability.  
 
The NSP was supposed to overhaul local 
governance structures and provide basic 
infrastructure in villages and rural settlements 
across the country. Since its inception in 2003 
the program has been rolled out in some 
29,000 villages and has had some success with 
delivering development projects at the local 
level.9 In 2007, the Independent Directorate of 
Local Governance (IDLG) was established but 
                                               
9
 See section on ‘state fragility in rural areas’ below for more 
information on the NSP. 
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it had great difficulties to build staff capacities 
in local governance institutions at the levels of 
the community and district development 
councils and the provincial councils.  
 
State fragility in rural areas10 
  
The availability of data and information on 
state fragility in rural areas in Afghanistan in 
the period 2007-2012 is limited. In 2011, an 
estimated 76.5 per cent of the Afghan 
population lived in rural areas (CIA 2013). In 
many of those areas, the presence of the state 
has historically been weak or non-existent. 
‘Villages have largely been self-managed 
institutions in which the state has had limited 
engagement’ (AREU 2010: 16). This is 
reflected in the persistence and significance of 
customary practices and traditional 
institutions, such as jirgas or shuras (village 
councils), maliks (village executives), and 
mullahs (village lawgivers); and the fact that 
most local public services in villages are 
provided through informal channels, if at all. 
In villages and rural areas the formal state 
justice system faces competition as 
populations have resisted the imposition of 
laws by the central government, regardless of 
whether the law was Shari'a law or the modern, 
Western style law. Crimes and conflicts have 
traditionally been handled under tribal or 
customary law (Jensen 2011). ‘Most rural 
households gain what welfare and security they 
can through informal means’ (AREU, Pain and 
Kantor 2010: 1). The survival, security, welfare 
and economic prosperity of rural communities 
has been dependent on their ‘ability to build 
patronage relationships with the district and 
[regional] political elites’ (AREU, Pain and 
Kantor 2010: 31), which in turn are linked to the 
central government through patronage networks. 
 
Since the ouster of the Taliban in 2001, the weak 
and besieged central government/state – 
artificially propped up by the international 
intervention force – has made considerable 
efforts to expand its reach across the national 
territory and into rural areas. The NSP and the 
creation of CDCs has been a flagship programme 
in this regard. Bypassing the state’s 
dysfunctional administrative structure, the NSP 
provides communities with block grants for 
                                               
10
 Based on Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 
(AREU) reports; and sources cited in the text. 
development projects chosen and implemented 
by elected Community Development Councils 
(CDCs) with very significant support from 
international NGOs. ‘By mid-2010, [the 
program] had ... been implemented in over 
29,000 villages across 361 of Afghanistan’s 398 
districts at a cost of nearly US$1 billion’ (Beath 
et al 2012:8). According to Barnett Rubin, ‘the 
program appears to work well in delivering 
projects to the village level, but it has not 
sparked any major institutional change. The 
CDCs exist in parallel to the historically rooted 
local institutions (for example, village shura, or 
local councils, meeting in the mosque). Afghans 
understand that the NSP depends on yearly aid 
appropriations of foreign donors and is not 
sustainable. Therefore, they treat it as a windfall 
rather than as an institution. Attempts to have the 
CDCs recognized as representatives of 
communities within the administrative structure 
have been met with fierce resistance’ (Rubin 
2009:20). 
 
Another limiting factor has been that much of 
this effort was driven by counter-insurgency and 
counter-narcotics concerns and not by a coherent 
development strategy. The Afghan state and its 
international supporters were on the whole not 
successful on both counts in the study period. 
While in some years significant reductions in 
opium poppy cultivations were observed in a 
number of provinces (e.g. Helmand, Nangarhar 
and Balkh), this was not primarily related to state 
interventions, such as the forced eradication of 
crops or the provision of development assistance 
to farmers, but rather to the actions of provincial 
governors and other powerholders or ‘shifts in 
the terms of trade between wheat and opium 
poppy and continuing concerns [on the part of 
farmers] over food security’ (AREU, Mansfield, 
2010: 3). 
 
For instance, in 2005-2006 the governor of 
Balkh produced reductions in opium poppy 
cultivation over a 12-month period in an attempt 
to gain political advantage. Yet ‘the [...] 
enforcement of the opium ban in Balkh [was] not 
an indication of improved governance; rather, it 
[was] a sign of a more comprehensive and 
organized attempt by local powerholders to gain 
political and economic support from the 
international community (AREU, Mansfield, 
2007: 15). In this process, ‘the rural population 
[saw] themselves as irrelevant and powerless 
bystanders or victims of a corrupt political 
process, through which local [strongmen] [were] 
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protected by authorities in Kabul’ (AREU, 
Mansfield, 2007: 10).  
 
The legitimacy of the local, provincial and 
national governments was undermined for the 
Karzai government’s willingness to risk 
deepening rural poverty in the pursuit of counter-
narcotics policies alienated rural populations. ‘In 
many areas where eradication or a ban on 
cultivation [was] implemented, some farmers 
actively looked to oppose the government and 
seek the support and protection of the 
insurgency. [...] The Taliban and other anti-
government forces [appeared] to be exploiting 
this sentiment. [...] There [was] a very real 
possibility that they encouraged cultivation to 
provoke the government to adopt a more 
aggressive eradication strategy [e.g. through 
aerial spraying of opium poppy fields] that 
would drive a wedge between the rural 
population and the government and its 
international supporters’ (AREU, Mansfield, 
2007: 17). 
 
Rural development profile 
 
Poverty11 
 
Poverty head count for rural areas 
Data on Afghanistan does exist within our time 
period but it is difficult to discern trends in rural 
poverty from this. Most of the current 
understanding of poverty trends in Afghanistan 
comes from the 2007/9 National Risk and 
Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA). While also 
not strictly comparable it is possible to discern 
some trends by going outside our time period 
and look at comparisons between the 2005 
NRVA and the 2007 round. Broadly, according 
to a 2010 World Bank report which cites the 
2007 data, the urban poverty rate is estimated at 
29% of households with the rural poverty rate at 
26% (WB, 2010: 27).  
 
Rural households account for 80% of the total 
population, with “36% of Afghan households 
relying on farming as their main source of 
income while another 6% depend on farm wages 
as their main source of income” (ibid.). 
 
However, between 2005 and 2007 it seems that 
access to rural irrigated land had increased by 
11% (formerly 57% and now 69%), and that 
                                               
11
 Based on World Bank 2010, 2012; UN 2009, 2011 and 
other references indicated in the text 
12% of households with irrigated land were 
engaged in opium production as their first crop; a 
worrying trend given it was reported as 3% in 
2005 (NRVA, 2007: 48). More positively, this 
also included a rise in cereal production of 8% 
(ibid. 41). 
 
A disaggregated analysis of the poverty gap 
shows it is at its lowest in the urban areas, where 
it is 6% (ibid: 26). Moreover, the Bank estimates 
that the “urban poor are on average just as poor 
as the rural poor because the poverty gap is 
lower in urban areas, but in the same proportion 
to the headcount as in rural areas” (ibid.). 
 
Relative food consumption 
According to World Bank data from 2012, “food 
insecurity certainly appears to be more 
pronounced in rural parts. For example, calorie 
deficiency affects 30% of the population in rural 
areas compared to 24% in urban areas, while 
21% of the rural population is affected by poor 
dietary diversity compared to 14% of their urban 
counterparts” (WB 2012: 13). 
 
In terms of agricultural production 
approximately 70% of the cultivated crop area is 
devoted to wheat and about 15% is devoted to 
rice, barley and maize (Chabot and Dorosh 
2007), where “wheat is both a major production 
crop and the main staple of the Afghan diet, with 
wheat flour contributing 57% to the total caloric 
content of the average bundle of food items of 
the relatively poor” (WB 2012: 8). The local 
production of cereals met nearly three-fourths of 
the total national demand during 2004-2008, 
with wheat and barely the first crops, maize, rice 
and vegetables or fodder crops etc. the second 
crops, with the second crops often using the 
same amount of land than the first crop in total, 
depending on the water availability. It would, 
therefore, be useful to understand the degree of 
second cropping and what types of households 
have the resources to undertake it. 
 
Livelihood Dynamics 
According to the Government of Afghanistan 
agriculture is the main source of livelihood in the 
country, where “seasonality is a strong correlate 
of poverty in Afghanistan” (WB 2010: 30). 
Indeed, rural households are the most vulnerable 
to seasonality, generating the majority of their 
incomes from agricultural activities and are 
unable to sustain their key livelihood source for 
half of the year, depending on the region. On 
average, only 4% of Afghan households generate 
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any revenue from their principal income source 
during winter months. Afghanistan is particularly 
subject to extreme temperatures events with 
droughts and severe winter conditions affecting 
livelihoods of exposed communities (ibid. 30).  
 
Diversification is certainly a fundamental 
characteristic of Afghan households’ livelihood 
strategies (ibid. 39). Again, according to the WB 
“rural households – on average – engage in twice 
as much income generating livelihood activities 
than their urban counterparts” (ibid. 39). Such 
diversification had been highlighted earlier in a 
2004 study by the AREAU which pointed to the 
fact that “the majority of households, both rich 
and poor, have diversified income sources and 
many are involved in a combination of farm and 
non-farm work. For wealthier  households 
livelihood diversity is generally a strategy of 
accumulation, but diversity of income sources is 
more of a coping mechanism for poorer wealth 
groups” (Grace and Pain 2004: 44).   
 
Educational Inequalities 
In terms of other inequalities the 2010 estimates 
for “urban poor school enrolment was 46% while 
for the rural poor it was 36%, with the poverty 
rate among households whose head does not 
have any education being as high as 35%” (WB 
2010: 53). The rate of poverty does in fact fall 
gradually as the head of the household becomes 
more educated, with the rate dropping to 23% 
among households where the head has had some 
form of high school education (ibid.). When 
comparing primary enrolment rates among the 
non-poor and the poor, urban areas show a larger 
disparity (55% vs. 46%), while there is no 
meaningful disparity in rural areas (35% vs. 
36%) (ibid: 56). 
 
Service Delivery 
As Lister puts it, ‘centralised state institutions in 
Afghanistan have co-existed uneasily with 
fragmented, decentralised traditional society 
since attempts at state-building began there’ 
(Lister 2007: 3). The difficulty of this state 
building exercise is perhaps reflected in the 
paucity of data on service delivery, which is not 
well disaggregated in terms of rural and urban 
ratios. The 2010 World Bank PRSP strategy 
progress report on the Afghan National 
Development Strategy (ANDS) does provide a 
fairly impressive list of efforts and achievements 
in the agriculture and rural development sector. 
This ranges from a vast number of rural 
development projects (over 12,000), the 
development of new land ownership laws, to the 
large scale distribution of wheat seed and 
fertilizer but it is not clear to whom and where 
these benefits have accrued (WB 2010: 38).  
 
Much the same can be said for data on the health 
and education sector. In Afghanistan, the school 
population has grown from under one million in 
2001 to 5.7 million in 2007. In the same period 
the number of schools has trebled to 9,062 in 
2007 including 1,337 all girls and 4,325 co-
educational schools. Similarly, the number of 
teachers has increased seven-fold to 142,500 of 
whom nearly 40,000 are female. Fifty thousand 
of these teachers have received in-service teacher 
training  
 
The number of reformed religious schools that 
teach a broad-based Islamic education 
curriculum has also increased to 336 and the 
National Islamic Education Council was 
established to oversee and monitor the delivery 
of Islamic education across the country (IMF 
2008: p-.112).  
 
However, health services have not experienced 
such a significant improvement. In Afghanistan 
there are only 1.9 doctors per 100,000 citizens 
and 25% of the deaths of child under 5 year are 
caused by the completely treatable condition of 
pneumonia (WHO 2012). In 2012, there were 56 
district hospitals, 30 provincial hospitals and 20 
regional hospitals, out of a total of 106 hospitals 
nationally (WHO 2012b). However, while we 
can discern these national trends this information 
is not disaggregated in terms of rural and urban 
ratios.    
 
Violence against Women 
 
The types of socio-cultural inequalities faced by 
women 
It is well known that women in Afghanistan have 
little access to education. In 2010 the literacy 
rate for women aged 15 to 24 was 22%, 
compared to 51% for men, with the enrollment 
rates for girls aged 6 to 9 28 % lower than for 
males (31% compared to 43%) (WB, 2010: 12). 
However, while child labour is almost “three 
times as high in rural areas” it is twice as high 
amongst boys than girls (ibid: 11). This may well 
reflect cultural practices around female 
segregation and purdah norms in predominantly 
tribal areas.  
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Violence Against Women (VAW) 
The correlations between cultural norms and 
VAW are often complex but it is clear that 
“women in both rural and urban settings are at 
risk of rape, but the risk appears to be greater for 
women in rural areas [.... and] when it comes to 
sexual violence in the family, observers note that 
illiterate or poor women are less likely to report 
cases of violence, including rape” (UN, 2009: 
22). 
 
The forms of response by public authorities 
(shelters, policy formulation etc) 
In 2009 a law on the Elimination of Violence 
Against Women (EVAW) was drafted explicitly 
obliging the Afghan National Police to support 
victims, secure an individual’s rights and 
freedoms, and to investigate crime, while also 
requiring them to register all complaints of 
violence against women. This was to be wide-
ranging, with the High Commission for the 
Prevention of Violence against Women 
stipulating that all 34 provinces had to create 
provincial level EVAW commissions. However, 
it has been noted that the EVAW law “does not 
create a separate offence for crimes perpetrated 
in the name of “honour” and does not clearly 
define some other crimes, including rape, and the 
element of coercion that is required to 
distinguish it from consensual zina (sexual 
intercourse outside of marriage)” (UN 2011: 7). 
However, in the same year this draft law was 
undermined by Karzai and his government 
deciding to further implement Shia Family Law, 
further reducing women’s rights and legalising 
rape. 
 
What is clear is that systematic official statistics 
on the incidence of complaints of violence 
against women in Afghanistan do not exist and 
that most incidents go unreported. The only data 
that does exist is through the Afghanistan 
Independent Human Rights Commission, which 
recorded “2,299 incidents of violence against 
women that could be defined as crimes under the 
EVAW law between 21 March 2010 and 21 
March 2011”(UN 2011: 1). This can be partly 
explained by the limited number of female police 
officers who can handle these cases in a 
culturally sensitive manner, as well as there 
being few options for women after they have 
reported a case occurring in their household as 
they are largely economically and socially 
dependent on their husbands.  
Women’s ‘safe houses’ (mazar) are one of the 
very few places women can go after reporting 
such cases. 
 
There is also some evidence to suggest that 
implementation of the law is at its weakest in 
remote rural mountainous provinces. For 
example, in Kapisa and Uruzgan a lack of legal 
enforcement seems to have been consolidated by 
weak or inattentive government, insecurity and 
‘traditional’ practices. As the UN puts it, ‘in 
these provinces, women and girls rarely left the 
home and few can attend school. Even if they 
know about the EVAW law, women were 
usually unable to gain access to police or 
prosecutors, the offices of the Department of 
Women’s Affairs or the AIHRC” (ibid: 10).  
 
2. 2. Democratic Republic of the Congo  
 
CIFP fragility scores 
 
CIFP data on state fragility in DRC in the period 
2007-2012 is limited to the years 2007, 2008 and 
2011. The available data indicates that DRC has 
consistently exhibited fragility scores at or above 
6.5, on an aggregate level and across the 
dimensions of ‘authority’, ‘legitimacy’ and 
‘capacity’, with the exceptions of ‘legitimacy’ 
and ‘capacity’ in 2007, when the country was 
below 6.5, though above 6.0. In both 2008 and 
2011, the scores drop significantly on the 
aggregate level and across the dimensions of 
‘authority’, ‘legitimacy’ and ‘capacity’, with 
only a very small reversal of this trend 
experienced with respect to ‘capacity’ in 2011 
(see Table 2). CIFP considers a country which 
scores above 6.5 to ‘be performing poorly 
relative to others’ (CIFP 2006: 4). In 2011, DRC 
ranked 4 out of 197 countries on the CIFP 
Global Fragility Ranking, after Somalia, 
Afghanistan and Chad, and therefore was among 
the group of ‘worst global performers’ (CIFP 
2006: 4). 
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Table 2: CIFP Fragility Scores, Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), 2007-2011 
 
Source: CIFP 2007a; CIFP 2008; CIFP 2012 
 
National fragility trends disaggregated by 
authority, legitimacy and capacity12  
 
Authority 
In the study period, the extremely fragile 
Congolese state proved unable to exercise a 
monopoly of the use of force in many parts of 
the huge country, above all in the eastern 
regions, despite the signing of a formal peace 
agreement in South Africa’s Sun City resort in 
2002 and some initial progress with peace-
building. The state’s authority was challenged by 
armed rebel groups and social protest 
movements, particularly in the east and west. 
The government’s armed forces and police were 
involved in serious human rights violations, 
corruption and other wrongdoings; the legislative 
branch of government and the justice system 
remained subdued to the executive or largely 
inoperative. Traditional customary chiefs exerted 
significant unchecked authority in rural parts of 
the DRC, at times contributing to inter and intra-
communal conflict over land and other assets 
(see below).  
 
On numerous occasions and in several parts of 
the country, particularly in the east along the 
Rwandan border and the west close to the capital 
Kinshasa, the state armed forces were challenged 
by insurgent groups in the Kivus and Ituri 
regions and protest movements in the province 
of Bas Congo. In the process, hundreds of 
thousands of civilians were displaced, 
particularly in the east. These outbreaks of 
rebellion compelled the government of President 
Joseph Kabila, elected in 2006, to constantly 
renegotiate truces and terms of peace with a 
large number of non-state armed groups. But ‘the 
Congolese authorities [...] were perceived [...] as 
[having] no real desire to bring stability to the 
                                               
12
 Based on CIFP DRC country report 2007b; BTI 2008, 
2010, 2012; International Crisis Group 2013, 2007, 2010, 
2012; International Alert 2012. 
east of the country, either because it [was] not in 
their interests or because they [did] not feel it 
really [concerned] them’ (International Alert 
2012).  
 
At the same time, the ill-disciplined, ill-equipped 
and badly trained national army (FARDC), into 
which large numbers of fighters from numerous 
of the former warring factions had been 
integrated, were involved in many instances of 
serious human rights violations. ‘The national 
army remained a ragtag gang of criminal 
elements, which committed human rights abuses 
wherever it was deployed, according to the 
United Nations’ (BTI 2010). The UN Mission in 
the DRC/UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC 
(MONUSCO) deployed over 20,000 
peacekeepers, military observers and police 
personnel in the country under chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, and played a significant role in 
supporting government military operations 
against rebels and militias in the North and South 
Kivu and Ituri regions as well as in negotiating 
new truces and terms of peace.  
 
President Joseph Kabila, who was elected in 
2006 in what international observers said were 
the first relatively free and fair polls in more than 
four decades (though ‘considerable irregularities’ 
were also reported), centralized power in the 
presidency. The role of the judiciary and 
parliament, enshrined in the 2005 constitution, 
were curtailed for both branches of government 
were under-resourced and depended on the 
political patronage dispensed by the executive 
and his inner circle. Checks and balances did not 
function and the prime minister’s office was 
controlled by the president. A government 
campaign to curb very high levels of corruption 
in the state undermined the independence of the 
judicial branch of government because it was 
politically biased and failed to produce tangible 
results. The re-election of President Kabila in 
2011 failed to strengthen the authority of the 
central government and provincial and local 
elections remained to be held (see below). 
 
Legitimacy 
The legitimacy of the Kabila government and the 
extremely fragile Congolese state were 
consistently in question during the study period, 
not least because of charges of election 
irregularities, especially in the 2011 presidential 
polls, and the administration’s failure to hold 
provincial and local elections. The central 
government’s inability and unwillingness to 
Year/ 
score 
Aggregate 
fragility 
score 
Authority Legitimac
y 
Capacity 
2007 6.50 6.91 6.15 6.33 
2008 6.91 7.12 6.56 6.76 
2011 7.10 7.31 7.40 6.72 
21 
 
provide security and basic public services to the 
great majority of citizens and reduce very high 
poverty rates among them resulted in the loss of 
public confidence and trust in the state.13  
 
The political climate deteriorated considerably in 
early 2011 due to rapidly passed constitutional 
changes, including the abolition of the second 
round of presidential elections and the 
introduction of a simple majority vote for the 
presidential contest. The opposition claimed that 
the changes were tailored for President Kabila, 
and contradicted the Sun City peace agreement 
of 2002 and the consensus that had emerged 
around the 2005 constitution. In late 2010, two 
heavyweight opposition candidates, declared 
their intention to run for president and 
intimidation of opposition members by 
government security forces increased. Following 
irregularities, chaos and violence surrounding the 
elections in many parts of the country, the 
Independent National Electoral Commission 
declared President Kabila the winner in 
December 2011. The political opposition 
denounced the result as unacceptable; 
international observers, including from the 
Carter Center and the European Union, 
questioned the credibility of the polls; and armed 
rebel and militia groups in the east of the country 
called for Kabila’s resignation.  
  
Capacity 
With the exception of the capital Kinshasa and a 
few other larger urban centres and important 
mining areas, the state maintained either no or 
only a very rudimentary presence and 
infrastructure across the country. The provision 
of public services, including health and 
education, was severely limited. There were 
almost no state-sponsored social safety nets. 
Most local services were offered by churches and 
social and civil society organizations. The 
administration’s ability to operate was 
handicapped by corruption, underfunding and 
weak professionalism. As mentioned above, the 
state only rarely maintained law and order. State 
agents and civil servants often went unpaid and 
lacked equipment, relying on petty corruption to 
survive.  
 
 
 
                                               
13
 See the sections on ‘capacity’ and ‘rural development’ 
below for more information on public services. 
State fragility in rural areas14 
 
The availability of data and information on state 
fragility in rural areas in the DRC in the period 
2007-2012 is limited. It appears that state 
fragility in the DRC’s vast rural hinterland, in 
which some 66 per cent of the population lived 
in 2011 (CIA 2013), was essentially determined 
by:   
 
 The weakness and heavily contested 
legitimacy of the central government and 
state, including the state armed forces and 
police;  
 
 The lack of functioning administrative 
structures and the near absence of state-
sponsored public services and social safety 
nets beyond the capital and a few other 
larger urban centres; 
 
 The presence of rebel groups and militias, 
especially in the eastern Kivu provinces 
and the Ituri region, that openly challenged 
the central government’s authority and its 
monopoly of the use of force, and actively 
contributed to heightened levels of 
insecurity among rural populations 
 
 The existence of large communities of 
displaced persons and returning Congolese 
refuges living in conditions of 
humanitarian crisis;  
 
 The unchecked power of local traditional 
chiefs, who played a leading role in the 
country’s politics and administration and 
were tied into political patronage networks 
linking them to provincial and national 
institutions.  
 
In many rural areas of the country, customary 
chiefs, whose role is recognized in the 2005 
constitution but not clearly defined, were left in 
charge. The chiefs used their ‘key position 
between the state and communities to benefit 
from any state and international investments and 
to protect their own interests’. This fuelled 
conflict, ‘with intercommunal rivalries playing 
out in state institutions and among local and 
national politicians’ (International Crisis Group, 
ICG 2013). There were significant problems 
with respect to access to, and management of, 
                                               
14
 Based on International Crisis Group 2013, 2007: 
International Alert 2012. 
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land in rural areas. Land problems existed both 
because of significant levels of land insecurity 
and because of inter- and intra-community 
tensions. Such tensions were caused by 
competition over access to power, dysfunctional 
administrative institutions (land registries, etc.), 
and the duality between written land legislation 
and local customs. Land mediation projects in 
eastern DRC remained heavily dependent on 
external support and failed to take into account 
the structural causes that underpinned the most 
destabilizing land disputes, i.e. power struggles 
between groups or the dysfunctional land 
institutions like registries. 
  
Further, in North Kivu and other highly unstable 
regions the ‘illegal exploitation of natural 
resources continued unabated as [...] 
communities armed, animated by deep mutual 
resentments over land security, mass human 
rights abuses during the war and control over 
natural resources’ (ICG 2007). In North and 
South Kivu the mining sector is a fundamental 
part of the economy and a source of income, 
however small, for people living in the 
provinces. The development of the agricultural 
sector, which in the past used to be larger and 
more significant, at least in North Kivu, was 
impossible due to persisting insecurity in rural 
areas. 
 
Sexual violence against women in rural areas 
also continued to be a significant problem. 
‘Access to medical care [was] much more readily 
available in the provincial capitals; however, 
most victims [had to] cover long distances, often 
for several days or even weeks, before they 
[could] reach a health centre’ (International Alert 
2012). 
 
Rural development profile 
 
Poverty15 
 
Poverty head count for rural areas 
According to a 2013 International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) report, within the DRC “the 
proportion of the population living on less than 
one dollar per day was 70%” (IMF 2013: 37). 
There is a definite rural-urban disparity to this. In 
the DRC an average of seven out of ten 
households are categorised as poor whereas eight 
out of ten rural households are poor, with seven 
                                               
15
 Based on IMF 2013, ITUC, 2011 and other relevant 
sources indicated in the text. 
out of ten households poor in urban areas (ibid: 
14). Food makes up 62.3% of the expenditure of 
Congolese households (ibid: 25) with the ratio of 
“children under five who are moderately 
underweight decreasing from 31.1% in 2001 to 
25.1% in 2007 and 24% in 2010” (ibid: 28). 
However, this average disguises inequalities both 
in terms of areas of residence (27% in rural areas 
and 17% in urban areas) and provinces (ibid: 28).  
 
Again, it is difficult to show trends in the 
incidence of poverty within our study period. 
Much of the IMF data relies on simulations from 
data generated after government surveys carried 
out in 2005. These simulations indicate only a 
1% decrease in poverty just before our study 
timeline from 2005-2007, but this figure must be 
treated tentatively and it is not disaggregated in 
terms of rural and urban ratios.   
 
Relative food consumption data 
Conflict has certainly exacerbated food 
insecurity in the DRC. The most recent 
Integrated Food Security Phase Classification 
(IPC) analysis shows that the incidence of people 
in acute food insecurity was calculated at about 
6.4 million in June 2013, showing an increase of 
about 75,000 people compared to October 2012 
(FAO, 2013: 1). The analysis goes on to show 
that “two-thirds of them (about 4.2 million 
persons) are considered severely food insecure 
and are mostly concentrated in Northern Kivu 
province in the east and in Katanga province in 
the south, where the escalation of civil conflict in 
recent months severely damaged livelihood 
systems and caused massive displacement” 
(ibid.). 
 
It also seems that the prices of cereals increased 
sharply in the areas disturbed by civil conflict, 
escalating to record levels and showing a 
pronounced instability. In June of 2013 “prices 
of maize in Bunia in the eastern Ituri province, 
and Lubumbashi in the southern Katanga 
province, despite having declined as newly 
harvested crops increased supplies, were still 
about 44% and 52% higher respectively, than 
in Kisangani, Bandudu, Kikwit and 
Mbandaka markets, which were located in 
relatively peaceful areas of the country” (FAO, 
2013: 1) 
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Increases/decreases in employment levels 
correlated to poverty ratios  
(youth unemployment).   
The average national unemployment rate is 
6.5%. However, this estimate needs to be 
understood in a context where the majority of the 
population live on subsistence agriculture (IMF 
2013: 43). In these terms the unemployment rate 
in rural areas is near to zero, whereas the 
unemployment rate for urban areas in 2005 was 
17.8% (ibid.).  
 
This situation contrasts formal employment 
versus the informal sector where 
underemployment or disguised unemployment is 
around 75% in urban areas and 95% in rural 
areas (IMF, 2013.). Young people constitute 
more than half of the workforce and are most 
affected by unemployment, particularly in urban 
areas. Consequently, the unemployment rate for 
the 15-24 age bracket (32.2%) is about twice the 
national average for urban areas (17.8%) (ibid).  
This could be the result of high unskilled 
seasonal rural to urban migration amongst the 
youth but this would need systematic 
verification. Unfortunately, the data is not well 
differentiated in terms of gender. However, we 
do know that the percentage of women employed 
in the non-agricultural sector has witnessed a 
marked evolution from 21% to 34% between 
2001 and 2007 (ibid: 34). A key area that needs 
investigation is to what degree the non-
agricultural sector has increased as a result of 
illicit activities such as mining, but where no 
data currently exists. 
Table 3: Livelihood panel data (non)-PRSP 
livelihood reports  
Main household activities, excluding Kinshasa  
 
Agriculture  92.6%  
Fishing  19.8%  
Livestock  11.3%  
Hunting  9.7%  
Gathering  4.8%  
Agricultural products  17.6%  
Petty trade  12.3%  
Day jobs  6.9%  
Civil service  5.5%  
Crafts/small businesses  10.3%  
Source: WFP et al. 2008, p.41  
 
 
Service Delivery 
Fiscal decentralisation is certainly key to recent 
constitutional reforms, where the 2006 
constitution “assigns a key role to the provincial 
authorities in the delivery of health, education 
and agricultural services” (IMF 2013: 2). 
However, according to the IMF, it seems that the 
“devolution of services has been uneven across 
provinces due to varying degrees of institutional 
capacity” (ibid.). Resources available to the 
provincial authorities are slowly increasing and 
amounted to some 2% of GDP in 2009, minus 
the salaries paid directly to provincial civil 
servants by the central government (ibid.). 
However, current data shows that despite the 
plentiful fresh water resources of the country, 
access to drinking water still remains low, 
although it rose from 22% to 26% of households 
between 2005 and 2010. This is worse in rural 
areas where the sector has had less investment 
(ibid: 32). 
 
Violence Against Women 
Nationally, there is a high level of violence 
against women: 64% of women have reported 
experiencing violence since the age of 15 and 
49% within the past 12 months (IMF, 2013). 
Moreover, women are generally seen as being 
more exposed to the risks of prostitution (forced 
or otherwise), diseases and AIDS, where 
consequently women have a higher mortality rate 
than men (ibid.). 
 
There is also a definite link between sexual and 
gender-based violence and conflict. However, 
the politicised representation of this violence 
needs acknowledging where many commentators 
have argued that the primary international focus 
on VAW has led to the invisibility of other forms 
of sexual violence and torture against men, while 
undermining the incidence of non-conflict based 
violence against women, such as intimate-partner 
violence. Nonetheless, it has been well 
documented that sexual violence has been used 
as an instrument of war in eastern DRC. In 2010 
the UNFPA stated that 44% of perpetrators were 
civilians and 49% armed men in North Kivu, 
while in South Kivu civilians were slightly less 
with 33% of all actors (ITUC  2011: 26). Indeed, 
some calculations have been put forward; 
UNFPA further estimated that in the eastern 
DRC more than 8,000 cases of sexual violence 
took place annually in 2009 and 2010, with 
5,485 cases in North Kivu and 2,928 in South 
Kivu in 2010.  
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In terms of its rural development implications 
sexual and gender-based violence in eastern 
DRC is often linked to the exploitation of natural 
resources, where it has been associated with the 
control of both mining activities and military 
interests with rebel groups committing serious 
acts against the population, including murder and 
rape (ITUC 2011). This has been particularly 
true of provinces such as North and South Kivu. 
Many of these cases have involved gang rape in 
front of family members, as well as genital 
mutilation and forced incest (ibid.). 
 
The forms of response by public authorities 
(shelters, policy formulation etc) 
In response to these atrocities a new law on 
sexual violence was passed by parliament in 
2006. The legal framework prosecutes acts of 
sexual violence in more specific terms, where 
crimes of sexual mutilation and sexual slavery 
are now explicitly criminalised (ITUC 2011: 28).  
 
However, currently these actions may mean little 
in practice where, as the ITUC puts it the 
Congolese justice system is seen as 
“dysfunctional, under-sourced and staffed, and 
highly politicised due to frequent interferences 
by political and military authorities” (ibid: 27). It 
is also unclear how such legal systems operate 
within rural regions. 
 
2.3. Yemen 
 
CIFP fragility scores 
 
CIFP data on state fragility in Yemen is limited 
to the years 2007, 2008 and 2011. The available 
data indicates that Yemen exhibited aggregate 
fragility scores below 6.5 in 2007 and 2008, but 
saw this score increase significantly in 2011. 
Regarding ‘authority’, the country witnessed a 
consistent increase in fragility; regarding 
‘legitimacy’ there was a significant decrease 
between 2007 and 2008, which was followed by 
a significant increase in 2011, however; 
regarding ‘capacity’, the trend was more even, 
with a small decrease in 2007-2008 followed by 
a more significant increase between 2008 and 
2011. In 2011, Yemen ranked 5 out of 197 
countries on the CIFP Global Fragility Ranking, 
after Somalia, Afghanistan, Chad and DRC, and 
therefore was among the group of ‘worst global 
performers’ (CIFP 2006: 4). 
 
Table 4: CIFP Fragility Scores, Yemen, 2007, 
2008 and 2011 
Source: CIFP 2007a; CIFP 2008; CIFP 2012 
 
National fragility trends disaggregated by 
authority, legitimacy and capacity16  
 
Authority 
Created in 1990 through the unification of the 
Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and the People’s 
Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), the 
Republic of Yemen has since remained a divided 
nation with deep tribal, political, economic, 
religious and regional cleavages. National 
unification was followed by a brief civil war in 
1994, which consolidated northern dominance 
over the rest of the country and President Ali 
Abdullah Saleh’s hold on power (which lasted 
for more than three decades, ultimately ending in 
2011-12, when the ‘Arab Spring’ protest 
movement reached Yemen). In the study period, 
the state’s authority was challenged by a rebel 
group known as the Huthis in the Zaidi tribal 
area in the north-western Sa’ada region and 
secessionist Hiraak and affiliated armed groups 
in the south, as well as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula, which became more active.  
 
While some limited state-building progress was 
made in the years after the civil war, including 
administrative and political decentralization and 
the expansion of some public services, the 
central state’s authority was put to the test. 
Always tenuous and weak, particularly in the 
southern parts of the country and some northern 
regions along the border with Saudi Arabia, in 
the 2000s the state’s control of the national 
territory and its monopoly of the use of force 
came increasingly under pressure from the 
Huthis in the Zaidi tribal area in the north-
                                               
16
 Based on CIFP Yemen Risk Assessment 2007b; BTI 2008, 
2010, 2012; World Bank Yemen Country Social Analysis 
2006; CDFAI The New Terrorism: Understanding Yemen, 
2011; International Crisis Group 2003, 2009, 2011, 2012; 
Lewis 2013. 
Year/ 
score 
Aggregate 
fragility 
score 
Authority Legitimac
y 
Capacity 
2007 6.46 5.94 7.06 6.57 
2008 6.45 6.20 6.11 6.29 
2011 7.0 7.38 7.24 6.62 
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western Sa’ada region and secessionist Hiraak 
and affiliated armed groups in the south. Al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula also became 
more active, up to the point that one observer 
concluded that ‘Yemen stands alongside 
Pakistan as one of the most important al-Qaeda 
strongholds in the world’ (Carment 2011). The 
army was divided and some commanders 
escaped the executive’s authority. Despite efforts 
to control the distribution and possession of 
personal weapons, the male population in rural 
areas remained armed. 
 
By comparable regional standards not a very 
repressive and more of an adaptable regime, the 
Saleh government ‘perfected the art of coopting 
its [tribal and political] opposition, and the 
extensive patronage network [...] discouraged 
many from directly challenging the president’ 
(ICG 2011:ii). Local, parliamentary and 
presidential elections have been held regularly 
without reports of major irregularities or 
election-rigging. The intricate government-
controlled patronage network extending from the 
capital Sanaa to, especially, the north of the 
country has fomented pervasive corruption 
among the civil service, the judiciary and the 
military and security services. ‘Overlaying a 
modern state upon Yemen’s traditional 
governance system has proved difficult, and both 
state formation and nation-building remained 
works-in-progress. [...]. To ensure its survival, 
the government [...] created informal political 
alliances with traditional shaiks, religious 
leaders, and powerful interest groups through 
intensive patronage networks outside of the 
formal state structures – which has given rise to 
the so-called parallel state’ (Lewis 2013: 6).  
 
This ‘parallel state’ allowed President Saleh to 
stay in power for a long time but ultimately 
undermined official state structures and the 
legitimacy and capacity of his administration. 
Heavily reliant on oil revenues the state’s tax 
base has been very small and its accountability 
therefore limited. The country’s formal 
education system was weak and service delivery 
was poor, with military spending among the 
highest in the Middle East and North Africa 
region. 
 
Legitimacy 
In the study period, the legitimacy of the central 
government/state was questioned by tribal, 
regional and religious groups that were excluded 
from the ‘official’ patronage networks, 
especially in the south but also some north-
western areas of Yemen, or which resisted 
stronger government authority, sometimes by 
force (see above). The country’s political 
leadership constantly and systematically – 
though not necessarily successfully – sought to 
disable opposition groups: NGOs critical of the 
regime were refused registration and thus kept in 
a legal limbo, arrests of and attacks against 
opposition leaders increased. The Saleh 
administration’s heavy-handed military response 
to the crisis in Saada and other violent hotspots 
around the country was accompanied by serious 
human rights violations by the state security 
forces and the displacement of large numbers of 
people, significantly adding to the state’s 
legitimacy deficit. The state’s limited capacity to 
provide basic public services through formal 
channels and reduce high levels of poverty 
among the majority rural and peri-urban 
population further undermined its legitimacy.17 
Decentralization did not help in this regard as it 
was limited to administrative and political 
decentralization and did not include financial 
transfer mechanisms targeted at reducing poverty 
(see below).  
  
Capacity 
Social security functions were largely fulfilled 
not by the state but by families, the tribe, village 
structures and private welfare organizations. 
Public expenditure for social safety nets was 
very low and programmes had a distinctly urban 
bias. In the early 2000s, only 28 per cent of the 
rural population were covered compared to close 
to fifty per cent of urban households. There was 
a significant shortage of courts, police stations 
and appropriately trained state employees, 
especially in rural areas where the majority of 
Yeminis live.  
 
Despite administrative and political 
decentralization, which became effective in 
2002, ‘the overall trend [has been] toward a state 
that is more centralized than at any time in its 
history. Though services [expanded] these [were]  
unevenly distributed and [had] an anti-poor bias. 
The quality of service provision [represented] a 
significant challenge. [...] The incorporation of 
informal but influential local leaders into the 
state structure [risked] undermining customary 
systems of accountability. Whereas traditional 
                                               
17
 See the sections on ‘capacity’, ‘state fragility in rural areas’ 
and ‘rural development’ below for more information on 
public services. 
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leaders in the past [had been] accountable to 
their local constituents through a complex set of 
rules and practices, the support they [received] 
from the central government [...] changed the 
‘rules of the game’ and [provided] autonomy 
from their traditional base. Local communities 
[were] increasingly dependent on such leaders 
because goods [were] redistributed through 
patronage networks’ (WB 2006: 7). 
Decentralization, which did not include financial 
transfer mechanisms targeted at reducing 
poverty, overall failed to increase the capacity of 
the Yemini state to deliver public services and 
goods across the country but especially in rural 
areas.  
 
State fragility in rural areas18 
 
The availability of data and information on state 
fragility in rural areas in Yemen in the period 
2007-2012 is very limited. It appears that the 
Yemeni state’s reach into rural areas, where the 
majority of the population lives - approx. 68 per 
cent in 2011 (CIA 2013) - has been hampered by 
several factors. ‘With the exception of villages 
that are close to urban areas, the structure of the 
modern nation state [...] only marginally touched 
rural areas. While rural inhabitants were 
increasingly relying on government services and 
institutions, they often had to go outside their 
villages to access these. As a result tribal shayks 
[...] played a convening role in both mobilizing 
the community for collective purposes and 
serving as the community’s interlocutors, 
lobbying local and central government for 
development projects’ (WB 2006: 8-9). This 
process has been described as the ‘amalgamation 
of formal and informal governance systems’ or 
the ‘[incorporation of] traditional authorities into 
the state’s formal institutions’ in which a weak 
central state sought to extend its reach across the 
national territory by both formal and informal, 
patrimonial means (World Bank 2006: 9, 10). 
  
The outcome of this process has varied across 
the country depending on the strength and 
legitimacy of the existing tribal governance 
structures. In the highlands, where the capital 
Sanaa is located, there has been more of a 
‘continuity of traditional governance systems 
albeit in the new context of the state which is 
modernizing yet whose reach remains limited. 
[...] In contrast, in the southern governorates 
                                               
18
 Based on World Bank, Country Social Analysis Yemen, 
2006; Lewis 2013. 
where the traditions of tribal leadership were less 
consensual and had also been seriously 
weakened by socialist rule the incorporation of 
formerly discredited sultans and shaykhs 
[generated] greater inequality and less 
accountable leadership’ (WB 2006: 10). It should 
be added that for political reasons the Saleh 
government was less committed to cater to the 
southern governorates, as well as some areas in 
the north, where tribes other than those 
associated with Saleh and his kin were 
competing with the government for authority and 
control, such as in the governorate of Saada (see 
above).   
 
Given the inadequate infrastructure of courts and 
police stations in rural areas, people there had 
little recourse to formal justice. In areas of the 
country were the tribal system was still largely 
intact and functioning, i.e. mostly in the northern 
governorates, rural populations could seek 
recourse to traditional forms of justice 
administered by shaykhs and other tribal leaders. 
Poor reliance on official state justice 
mechanisms, particularly in the peripheries, 
meant that people tended to take justice into their 
own hands, turning personal confrontations into 
family, tribal or religious ones (Lewis 2013). 
 
Rural development profile 
 
Poverty19 
 
Poverty head count for rural areas 
The 2007 Word Bank Poverty Assessment states 
that “urban areas benefited remarkably from the 
predominantly oil-led growth, which resulted in 
the rapid decline in the percentage of urban poor 
from 32.2% to 20.7%, despite an increase in 
urbanization” (WB 2007: 7). However, the report 
also shows that in “three of the seven rural 
regions where nearly 40% of the country’s poor 
live (Central North, Central South and Eastern) 
poverty unambiguously worsened by 10 to 15 
percentage points” (ibid). Poverty is shown to be 
at its worst in the rural part of the Amran 
governorate north of the capital Sana’a where 
71% of the population is poor. Next are the 
south-western Shabwah and Al-Baida 
governorates (60%), with the incidence of 
poverty at its the lowest in the south-eastern Al-
Maharah and Sana’a City governorates (ibid: 8).
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 Based on Word Bank Poverty Assessment 2007, World 
Food  Programme report 2012, FAO, 2011 and the OECD 
Social Institution and Gender Index, SIGI 
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These figures, however, are just prior to our 
study period and before the political crisis of 
2011, where it has been difficult to discern data 
for our actual study period. However, a more 
recent Joint Social and Economic Assessment 
(JSEA) report does exist which states that the 
political crisis caused an 11% drop in economic 
growth (JSEA 2012). Consequently, the report 
goes on to assert that although urban poverty 
rates rose even higher (possibly because of the 
urban concentration of the protests), the rural 
poverty rate also rose considerably from 47.6% 
just before the crisis to 59% afterwards. This 
negative correlation was also true for food 
security (ibid.).   
 
Relative food consumption data 
In parts of Yemen food insecurity is chronic. 
Yemen is currently ranked the 11th most food-
insecure country globally with one in three 
Yemenis suffering from acute hunger (WFP 
2012: 12). The country is almost entirely 
dependent on food imports and consequently 
Yemenis are highly vulnerable to any instability 
in prices, with the poorest households the most 
vulnerable (ibid: 7). 
 
Using 2009 Comprehensive Food Security 
Survey (CFSS) data, a 2012 WFP report 
estimates that 44.5% of the population is food-
insecure. This means that approximately 10 
million people in Yemen have restricted or no 
access to sufficient nutritious food, and are 
consuming a low quality diet according to agreed 
international standards. Proportionally, “over 
half the rural population (51%)  is food-insecure 
compared to 27% in urban areas” (ibid.).  
 
Furthermore, the number of severely food 
insecure households almost doubled between 
2009 and 2011, when in December 2011 the 
number rose from 12% to 22%. As the WFP 
states, “this means that an additional 2.7 million 
Yemenis have become severely food insecure 
during that tumultuous two-year period“(WFP 
2012). In addition, the CFSS shows that 13% of 
children under five years old are acutely 
malnourished.  
 
Fundamentally, agriculture in Yemen is affected 
by the lack of groundwater where the production 
of qat is seen as the major culprit as its 
production consumes 40% of the water supply; 
stemming the consumption of qat is currently 
seen as a key priority although it is 
acknowledged that this may cause widespread 
resistance within Yemeni society. It is now a 
major income source with qat production now 
contributing to 6 percent of all GDP and 33 
percent of agricultural production, with over 
600,000 estimated small scale qat farmers in 
Yemen, accounting for more than half of all 
small-scale farmers in the country. Moreover, qat 
production does also adversely affect food 
security by diverting agricultural production 
away from food production (JSEA 2012).  
 
Rural-urban disaggregated data on educational 
attainment, correlated to poverty ratios.  
Citing the 1998 Household Budget Survey data, 
the 2007 WB Poverty Assessment asserts that 
“the poverty rate for households headed by an 
illiterate person was 47.3% nationally - 48.8 % 
in rural areas and 39.9% in urban areas. These 
rates declined over the next few years to 44% 
nationally by 2005/6 - with 47% in rural areas 
and 34% in urban areas respectively” (WB, 
2007: 32). Perhaps not surprisingly the lowest 
poverty rate was among households headed by 
persons with a university degree and above, with 
the difference between the poverty rates of 
university graduates in urban and rural areas 
extensive - 5% versus. 29% (ibid: 32). 
 
Moreover, within the education sector there are 
significant supply side problems. The WB points 
to the fact that, “for both poor and non-poor, the 
share of supply-side reasons (no schools, no 
teachers, no female teachers, no sanitary facility) 
in rural areas are very large for both boys and 
girls. More than 35% of boys and about 50% of 
girls in rural areas do not attend school for these 
reasons” (ibid).  
 
Livelihood panel data (non)-PRSP  
livelihood reports  
Agriculture, including both livestock and crop 
production, is the key form of livelihood for 
about 85% of the population in Yemen (FAO, 
2011: 91). Agriculture provides only 15% of the 
national GDP, but it employs over half the 
labour force (ibid). Activities such as 
beekeeping, petty trading (including selling of 
qat), and the sale of pump water by land owners 
are some of the forms of livelihood 
diversification for rural communities (ibid.). 
However, as the FAO asserts “Yemen relies 
heavily on imported food items, importing 90% 
of wheat requirements and 100% of rice. As 97% 
of poor rural households are net food buyers, 
high food prices are one of the determining 
factors of food insecurity” (ibid.). 
28 
 
Increases/decreases in employment levels 
correlated to poverty ratios  
(youth unemployment).   
Youth unemployment (ages 15–24) is 
considerably higher than for the average general 
population at 28.3% (FAO, 2011: 44). As the 
WB states “unemployment in Yemen (ages 15+) 
increased from 13.7% in 1999 to 16.3% in 2004, 
even though there was a significant decline in 
poverty (from roughly 40% to 35%) (ibid: 13). 
However, the rural regional implications of this 
are unclear as the data is not disaggregated in 
terms of rural and urban ratios.  
 
Service Delivery 
In the study period, there were marked 
differences between rural and urban areas with 
respect to access to basic and secondary 
education. In the mid-2000s, female youth 
illiteracy in the age group 15-24 reached 73 per 
cent in rural areas compared to 18 per cent in 
urban areas. Rural families were exposed to 
poor-quality schooling and the education system 
was not adapted to rural livelihood systems. The 
main obstacles to women's education are poverty 
and a cultural bias in which parents prefer to 
send sons to school, avoiding placing their 
daughters in a mixed-gender environment (WB 
2007). There is also some evidence to show that 
the proportion of public expenditure on 
education was slightly skewed in favour of 
higher education for the middle classes (ibid.). 
However, the 2012 JSEA report does indicate 
that there have been improvements in the 
education sector with girls’ enrolment having 
improved from 42% in 1997/98 to 66% in 
2010/2011, while acknowledging that gender 
gaps in education are still large, particularly in 
rural areas (JSEA 2012: 116).  
 
In terms of public healthcare, in 2012, Yemen 
had 2,774 hospitals with only 2 doctors and 15.9 
nurses for every 100, 000 citizens. Rural areas 
are certainly more poorly serviced than urban 
areas. Geographical access to health facilities 
was severely limited with only 24 per cent of the 
rural population having access to health facilities 
compared to 42 per cent across all areas (Lewis 
2013). Unfortunately, data on the rural and urban 
ratios of health service delivery is sparse. There 
is some 2005 data on measles immunisation 
cited by the WB, which shows a noticeable urban 
and rural gap at 12% (WB 2007: 38).  
 
 
 
Violence Against Women 
 
The types of socio-cultural inequalities faced by 
women 
The current status and rights of women have 
been significantly affected by the 1994 
constitution drafted upon unification and 
particularly article 31, which declares that, 
"women are sisters of men and they have rights 
and duties as guaranteed by Shari'a and the law." 
This article has been the cornerstone of a number 
of Yemen's laws, with Yemen's male clergy and 
legislators citing the Shari'a as the basis of its 
legal principles. As SIGI argues, “the wording of 
Article 31 implies that women are not the equal 
citizens but rather are the sisters of male 
citizens” (OECD, 2013).  
 
Currently, Yemeni women constitute 24.6% of 
the workforce, where nearly 86% of women in 
the workforce are in the agricultural sector, with 
most of this classified as informal and 
unregulated labour, with 8% of women 
employed in paid jobs and 9.3% of these in the 
civil service and public sector (OECD, 2013.).   
The number of women registered to vote has 
risen from 15% of the total electorate in 1993 to 
42% in the 2003 parliamentary elections. 
However, only 2 women have been appointed to 
the 111-member Shura Council, with women 
comprising a low 0.6 % of the total membership 
of local councils (OECD 2013.).  
 
The forms of response by public authorities 
(shelters, policy formulation etc) 
Despite there being very few women in positions 
of authority in Yemen, there are some highly 
active women’s rights organisations in the 
country, whose members operate in an often 
inhospitable environment. Women’s rights 
NGOs have been central in drafting a law to 
increase the minimum age of marriage, which 
also requires marriage contracts to be certified by 
a judge (this has been waiting for presidential 
approval since 2009). These groups have also 
been highly engaged in improving awareness of 
domestic violence and the damage caused by 
early marriage and female genital mutilation 
(FGM) (OECD 2013.).   
 
Forms of legal redress 
Currently, as SIGI states, “there is no legislation 
in place in Yemen addressing domestic violence 
(OECD 2013). This is despite the fact that 
domestic violence is believed to be common in 
Yemen” (OECD 2013), but accurate figures on 
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prevalence rates are not obtainable, and certainly 
not in terms of rural and urban proportions 
(ibid.). Moreover, female genital mutilation is 
not illegal in Yemen and attempts to criminalise 
it were rejected by parliament. It is banned in 
state hospitals but continues to take place in 
private clinics. 
 
The prevailing view is that a small minority of 
women actually report domestic abuse, due to a 
lack of trust in the police and judiciary, but also 
because many people in Yemen perceive 
physical violence by husbands as a legitimate 
means of ensuring marital obedience (OECD 
2013.). SIGI cites Human Rights Watch reports 
which state that women who report domestic 
violence to the police are often themselves 
imprisoned, and are only released when a male 
relative collects them (ibid.).  
 
Given the lack of women’s representation on 
local councils and the low rates of school 
enrolment by girls in rural areas there does seem 
to be a fairly minimal increase in women’s 
formal and informal rights in recent years within 
Yemen, which may have significant implications 
for violence against women in rural areas. This 
needs careful and timely investigation. 
 
2.4. Nepal  
 
CIFP fragility scores 
 
CIFP data on state fragility in Nepal is limited to 
the years 2007, 2008 and 2009/2011 
(‘authority’). The available data indicates that in 
this period Nepal has consistently been under the 
6.5 mark or only slightly above it, on an 
aggregate level and across the dimensions of 
‘authority’, ‘legitimacy’ and ‘capacity’. One 
notable exception to this trend was the increase 
of the ‘authority’ score between 2007 and 2008, 
which remained on a relatively high level in 
2011 (see Table 3). As such, Nepal is not in the 
group of seriously fragile countries, as are 
Afghanistan, DRC and Yemen. In 2011, Nepal 
ranked 31 out of 197 countries on the CIFP 
Global Fragility Ranking, next to Tajikistan (30) 
and close to Mali (29). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: CIFP Fragility Scores, Nepal, 2007, 
2008 and 2011 
 
Source: CIFP 2007; CIFP 2008; CIFP 2010; CIFP 2012 
 
National fragility trends disaggregated by 
authority, legitimacy and capacity20 
 
Authority 
In the study period, Nepal embarked on a 
protracted and as of yet inconclusive transition 
from the end of the decade-long armed conflict 
between the state and Maoist insurgents to the 
establishment of a new post-conflict order based 
on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which 
had been negotiated between the Seven-Party-
Alliance (SPA) and the Communist Party of 
Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M) and entered into effect 
in November 2006. Yet in the following years 
Nepal’s unitary, centralized and non-inclusive 
state structure was left largely intact and unable 
to accommodate and respond to the demands of 
the country’s large number of ethnic groups. 
Political instability prevailed. While the first 
president of the newly founded Federal 
Democratic Republic of Nepal was elected and a 
new coalition government was formed in July 
2008, in the following three years three prime 
ministers were confirmed in office. The state’s 
monopoly on the use of force was established in 
many parts of the country, though it remained 
weak in the southern Tarai region along the 
border with India as well as in several other 
regions in the highlands (see below).   
 
The 2006 ceasefire held but the progress of 
peace and state-building was slow and little 
advances were made on implementing crucial 
elements of the peace plan. Following the 
nomination of an interim parliament and the 
election of a constituent assembly in 2008 in 
polls that were generally regarded as free and 
fair, the Maoists and the largest opposition 
                                               
20
 Based on BTI Nepal 2008, 2010, 2012; International Crisis 
Group 2007, 2008, 2011, 2012a 2012b; International Alert 
2012; ICAF 2011; DFID and WB 2006. 
Year/ 
score 
Aggregate 
fragility 
score 
Authority Legitimac
y 
Capacity 
2007 6.15 6.42 5.72 6.14 
2008 6.55 7.02 6.50 6.20 
2009 6.20 6.64 
(2011) 
n/a n/a 
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political parties (UML and Nepali Congress) 
were locked in prolonged negotiations over the 
substance of the new constitution, the form and 
implementation of federalism, and the future of 
the demobilized Maoist combatants. Unable to 
reach agreement on the country’s new 
constitution, the deadlock generated by the 
political parties caused atrophy in Nepal’s 
corrupt and fragile state bureaucracy, decreasing 
the authority, effectiveness and legitimacy of 
governance across the country. The constituent 
assembly was ultimately dissolved in 2012, 
failing to produce a new constitution. 
  
Among the few achievements was a deal in 2011 
on the Maoist fighters. They were scheduled to 
leave the cantonments where they had been 
concentrated since the end of hostilities and enter 
the army or civilian life. The state’s monopoly 
on the use of force was established in many parts 
of the country, though it remained weak in the 
southern Tarai region along the border with 
India, where half of Nepal’s population lives and 
Madhesis, plainspeople, organized in sometimes 
violent protest against the discrimination that 
excluded them from public life. Several Madhesi 
armed groups sprang up in the region, which was 
also affected by organized criminal and terrorist 
splinter groups. Underlying the protest and 
violence in the Tarai were grievances related to 
the non-resolution of critical issues, such as the 
return of land seized during the conflict, wider 
land reform, and the re-establishment of elected 
local government in a federal political system.  
 
Political authority remained centralized in the 
hands of minority elite groups, such as the high-
caste Brahman, Chhettri and Kshatriya. ‘The 
dominant order [...] remained largely confined to 
male Brahmans (Bahuns) and Kshatriyas 
(Thakuris and Chhetris) from the traditionally 
influential Parbatiya or Hill Hindu group, and the 
urban-based and generally well-educated 
Newars. [...] The [traditional] political parties 
continued to operate on the basis of deeply 
embedded and mutually reinforcing feudal, caste 
and patriarchal norms and networks. [...] Those 
left at the margins were women; the ‘tribal’ 
indigenous ethnic groups, the Adivasi Janajatis 
or ‘indigenous nationalities’; and the formerly 
‘untouchable’ castes now calling themselves 
Dalits (‘oppressed’, ‘broken’ or ‘crushed’).  
 
 
 
Muslims [...] and the plains dwellers or 
Madhesis, who have substantial numbers but are 
largely excluded from political influence, [...] 
were also on the margins’ (DFID and WB  
2006: 3).      
 
The Nepalese state was largely unable to 
administer and deliver justice and in many parts 
of the country, especially in more remote rural 
areas, state justice mechanisms were used only 
for the most serious criminal cases, while people 
otherwise turned to non-state justice provision 
comprising traditional and indigenous 
mechanisms for dispute resolution or had no 
access to justice at all. ‘Cost, geographic 
obstacles, corruption, social stigma, and lengthy 
and complex processes all [presented] significant 
obstacles to the average Nepali citizen in 
accessing state justice services. Women, the poor 
and those belonging to marginalised groups 
[experienced] extremely limited access to state 
justice mechanisms’ (International Alert 2012: 
9). There were concerns that ‘in the absence of a 
strong state justice sector to counterbalance and 
oversee the non-state sector [that] non-state 
mechanisms [went] beyond their mandates and 
[mediated] criminal cases, thereby superseding 
the criminal justice system of the state. Some 
traditional non-state mechanisms also [delivered] 
verdicts and punishments which [did] not take 
human rights and gender equality norms into 
account (International Alert 2012: 9). Further, 
throughout the study period the administrative 
system was bogged down by pervasive 
corruption, seriously undermining its 
effectiveness and legitimacy.      
 
Legitimacy 
The legitimacy of the Nepalese government and 
state was in question throughout the study 
period. There was ‘widespread dissatisfaction 
with the quality and amount of government 
services, especially education, health, 
infrastructure and agricultural support’ (ICAF 
2012: 9).21 This was particularly noticeable in 
the Tarai region along the border with India 
where trust between many Madhesis and several 
other ethnic groups and the government in 
Kathmandu all but collapsed. People there were 
angry about what they perceived as 
discrimination by the central government and 
minority elite groups and the failure of the 
                                               
21
 See sections on ‘capacity’, ‘state fragility in rural areas’ 
and ‘rural development’ below for more information on 
public services.  
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constituent assembly to finalize a new 
constitution which would allow for the holding 
of local elections, which were believed to 
improve the responsiveness of local government 
and the quality of public services. ‘This belief 
[was] grounded in their positive experience with 
elected local government before the war’ (ICAF 
2012: 23). While the ‘government [...] offered to 
address issues such as increased electoral 
representation, affirmative action for 
marginalised groups and federalism [it] dragged 
its feet over implementing dialogue [with the 
people in the Tarai region]’ (ICG 2007:i).      
 
Capacity 
Nepal’s administrative system remained 
ineffective, corrupt and quite authoritarian 
throughout the study period. The weak to 
nonexistent infrastructure (especially in rural 
areas) did not provide a sound administrative 
basis for political, social and economic 
development. Communities, traditional 
organizations and civil society organizations 
filled some of the governance gaps by providing 
services, including health, education and non-
state justice, and resolving disputes. ‘In addition 
to location-related service delivery problems, 
other supply side issues that influence public 
healthcare [included] the type of services 
offered, flexibility in timing for care provision, 
the public’s perception of the quality of care and 
attitudes of providers. The number of both public 
and private health facilities [...] increased [since 
the early 2000s] but the services [remained] 
easily accessible only to the richest groups or 
those closest to urban centres. Most healthcare 
facilities, including trained personnel, [were] 
concentrated in urban areas while rural facilities 
[remained] under-staffed and under-supplied 
(DFID and World Bank 2010:71). Further, there 
was virtually no social welfare system outside of 
social networks based on family structures. 
Private initiatives were isolated and public 
services were underdeveloped and insufficient, 
although access improved somewhat in the 
course of the study period. The state 
implemented a few social programmes, including 
a civil service pension, food-for-work 
programmes, social pensions, and microcredit 
and micro-insurance programmes. But these 
programmes only reached a small number of 
beneficiaries and had a narrow budget base. 
 
State fragility in rural areas22  
 
The availability of data and information on state 
fragility in rural areas in Nepal in the period 
2007-2012 is very limited. In 2006, Nepal was 
still largely a rural country, with some 86 and 83 
per cent of the population living in rural areas in 
2005 and 2011, respectively, with the remaining 
population living in the capital Kathmandu and a 
few other larger urban centres (DFID and WB 
2006: 18; CIA 2013). It appears that rural areas, 
particularly but not exclusively in the Tarai 
plain, were characterized by high levels of state 
fragility along all three dimensions of authority, 
legitimacy and capacity.  
 
As mentioned above, in the study period the 
Tarai region, a long-neglected border land, saw 
persisting insecurity and some violence due to 
the existence of criminal and Madhesi armed 
groups involved in kidnapping, extortion and 
robbery. ‘The open border with India 
[contributed to these problems], as armed 
groups, drugs and human trafficking [were able 
to] freely cross in many places’ (ICAF 2012: 9). 
Further, the state was unable to mediate and 
resolve disputes over land in the region. ‘In the 
mid-west Tarai [...] Pahasis displaced from the 
Hills by the conflict [...] decided to stay, 
attracted by the fertility of the land [...] 
Meanwhile in the same area, the Kamaiya 
indigenous group [had] still not [received] land 
that was promised to them ten years ago by the 
government. Madhesis in the Midwestern, 
Western and Eastern Tarai also [complained] 
about Pahadis, but here they focused not on land 
but on feeling threatened by Pahadi dominance 
of government, lack of access to government 
services and lack of recognition of Madhesi 
rights and identity (ICAF 2012: 11). 
Consequently, most Madhesis did not trust the 
government and their demands became more 
radical. Yet ‘the Madhesi issue must be seen in 
the broader context of the centre-periphery 
divide and the interplay of geography, caste, 
ethnicity and politics in Nepal. Discrimination 
spans the country, with several communities in 
the hills facing similar exclusion’ (ICG 2007: 1).  
 
State service provision in the Tarai and other 
rural areas was highly deficient, with women, the 
poor and groups that are marginalised due to 
ethnicity and caste membership experiencing 
                                               
22
 Based on DFID and WB 2006, 2010; ICAF 2012; ICG 
2007. 
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hardship. This state of affairs clashed with ‘the 
consciousness of Nepalis who – even in rural 
areas – increasingly [saw] themselves as 
sovereign rights holders. Nevertheless, many 
formal and informal institutions and policies 
[remained] stubbornly exclusionary in terms of 
gender, caste and ethnicity, and most demands of 
those excluded [remained] unmet’ (DFID and 
WB 2010:47). 
 
Rural development profile 
 
Poverty23 
 
Poverty head count for rural areas 
A recent DFID report shows that chronic poverty 
is primarily concentrated in the mountainous mid 
and the far western regions of Nepal, but 
vulnerability is spread across the country (2013: 
4). Using a multi-index of chronic poverty, the 
region of Karnali had the most chronic poverty 
(70%), followed by Seti (49%), Mahakali (43%), 
Bheri (30%) and Rapti (23%) (ibid: p-6). As the 
report puts it, “this contrasts strikingly with the 
9.6% rate found in urban locations” (ibid: 10).  
 
Relative food consumption data 
 
A 2009 study conducted by the WFP ranks 
Nepal 57th out of 88 countries on the Global 
Hunger Index (GHI). With a GHI of 20.6, the 
severity of hunger in Nepal is acute. The eastern 
region fares the best at 20.40, whereas the mid-
west is the most severe with a hunger index of 
28.20. The mountain zones (27.90) are also 
highly insecure in comparison to both the Terai 
(23.10) and the Hills (21.50) (ODI 2012: 11). 
 
The report indicates that there is certainly “a 
negative correlation” between Nepal’s recent 
history of civil conflict and livelihood/food 
security indicators (ODI 2012: 14). It shows that 
local food production was affected by factors 
such as: “the reduced amount of family labour 
available; out migration and conscription; the 
confiscation of farmland; disruptions to 
agricultural services and inputs” (ibid.), although 
the report is unclear about which regions are 
most acutely affected.   
 
                                               
23 Based on UK Department for International Development 
report 2013, ODI 2012, Asian Development Bank report 
2009, the OECD Social Institution and Gender Index, SIGI 
and other literature cited in the text. 
Rural-urban disaggregated data on educational 
attainment, correlated to poverty ratios 
 
 DFID’s 2013 data indicates that in Nepal 
“chronically poor households are particularly 
disadvantaged in terms of educational 
attainment” (DFID 2013: 11). For example, 
“only 15% of chronically poor household adults 
can read and write while the percentage is 42 for 
non-poor households” (ibid.). These rates are 
also highly gendered in terms of the following 
literacy rate:  
 
Table 6: Gendered urban and rural literacy 
levels 
 
 
Urban Rural 
Male - 78% Male - 51.9 
Female - 54.8 Female – 22 
Source: DFID, 2013.  
 
Increases/decreases in employment levels 
correlated to poverty ratios  
(youth unemployment).   
The Asian Development Bank estimates that, 
“Nepal’s labor productivity or GDP per worker 
is the lowest in South Asia when, in 2006, 
Nepal’s GDP per worker was estimated at $614 
in 2000 terms (ADB et al. 2009: 15). Farmers 
with small landholdings are particularly 
vulnerable to underemployment and the 
provision of more productive employment 
opportunities, “particularly to people in 
subsistence or near-subsistence agriculture, the 
youth, people internally displaced by the 
conflict, and former People’s Liberation Army 
members” is seen as major problem for Nepal in 
the future (ibid: 16).  
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Underemployment is especially critical in rural 
areas, due to weak agricultural growth (DFID 
2013: 12), where inequitable economic 
opportunities are caused by unequal access “to 
education and skills development, infrastructure 
facilities (roads and electricity) and productive 
assets (land and credit)” (ibid.). 
 
Livelihood panel data  
As noted, armed civil conflict is understood to 
have seriously affected livelihoods and new 
opportunities in Nepal. However, a 2010 study 
by Upreti and Müller-Böker cited by ODI, 
argues that the “reduction in livelihood 
opportunities has been accompanied by a trend 
towards diversification” (ODI 2012: 17.), and 
where the ratio of people living in urban areas is 
still comparatively low at 17% (ibid.18). In this 
sense, the prevalence of poverty is symptomatic 
of the fact that poverty in rural areas is a result of 
low returns from agriculture but where 
households whose head is reliant on wage labour 
are also the poorest in comparison to those self 
employed in agriculture (DFID  2013: 11).  
 
Service Delivery 
The WFP views the quality of services across the 
country as being poor, where the quality was 
particularly severe in the mountains and the mid-
Western regions (DFID 2013: 12). However, 
there are a mixed number of service providers, 
with the Government of Nepal stating that it will 
spend “at least 20% of its allocated budget on the 
basic services sector” (ibid.29).  
 
Within the health sector there are government, 
non-government as well as private teaching 
hospitals, together with a fairly extensive 
network of female community health volunteers. 
Over 2 million people have used the family 
planning services, and child vaccination is fairly 
good with 87% coverage in rural areas (DFID 
2013.).  
 
Nepal’s education sector has followed a policy of 
decentralising school management to local 
communities. Over the period of 2002/03 to 
2009/10, “a total of 9,810 schools (including 
6,644 primary level, 236 lower secondary level 
and 1,030 secondary level) were decentralised in 
a bid to empower communities” (ODI 2012: 34). 
From 2009 onwards the government has also 
introduced School Sector Reform Plan (SSRP), 
“with an estimated total cost of US$ 2.6 billion 
over its first five years” (ibid.). By 2007 Nepal 
had 27,525 primary schools, 299,000 certified 
teachers, with 9.6 percent of the national budget 
allocated to education (IMF 2007: 45). However, 
current data does not differentiate between the 
rural and urban sectors, or discuss how 
educational institutions have been affected by the 
years of civil conflict.  
 
Violence Against Women 
 
The types of socio-cultural inequalities faced by 
women 
Again, the 2013 DFID report states that, “gender 
differences are very apparent with males having 
higher educational attainment than women and 
with the difference widening in more remote 
areas and in successive levels of educational 
attainment”  (2013: 12), with these divisions 
most acute in rural areas. The report shows that, 
“women’s empowerment and gender disparity 
was worst in the Far-West (86%) and Mid-West 
(77%) followed by Central (40%), Eastern (27%) 
and Western regions (14%) (ibid: 29). These 
figures were ascertained using a gender disparity 
index which had the following six indicators: 
literacy status (%); years of schooling; 
percentage of female headed households; 
women’s participation in local elections; women 
in professional occupations; women in 
administrative occupations. 
 
The level and forms of legal address, such as 
current legislation on domestic violence, rape 
etc, as well as attrition rates 
As the OECD Social Institutions and Gender 
Index shows, “the Gender Equality Bill of 2006 
redefined the definition of rape to include 
instances of marital rape, as reasons for divorce, 
although the maximum penalty for marital rape 
is still only six months’ imprisonment” (OECD 
2013). The law has also raised the criminal 
punishment for all other forms of rape to 
between five and twelve years imprisonment. 
Finally, in 2009 Nepal passed its first law against 
domestic violence - the Domestic Violence and 
Punishment Act 2065. However, criminal 
sanctions are still poor (ibid.), and it is not 
known what regional reach the legal provisions 
have had. The maximum penalty is 25,000 
rupees (US$330) and six months imprisonment, 
with punishments doubling for repeat offenders. 
Equally, sexual harassment is now also a 
criminal offence, “with punishments of a fine of 
up to 10,000 rupees and prison sentences of up to 
one year” (ibid.). 
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2.5. Bolivia 
 
CIFP fragility scores 
 
CIFP data on state fragility in Bolivia in the 
period 2007-2012 is limited to the years 2006-
2007. Relative to the other country cases that are 
analysed in this study, Bolivia is something of an 
outlier. The available data for 2006 and 2007 
indicates that Bolivia was well below the 6.5 
mark, on an aggregate level and across the 
dimensions of ‘authority’, ‘legitimacy’ and 
‘capacity’. The country obtained its highest 
scores in the dimensions of ‘legitimacy’ and 
‘authority’ in 2006, but overall the trend was one 
of decreasing fragility (see Table 5). In 2011, 
Bolivia ranked 68 out of 197 countries on the 
CIFP Global Fragility Ranking, way above the 
other four countries included in this study.    
 
Table 7: CIFP Fragility Scores, Bolivia, 2006 
and 2007 
Source: CIFP 2006; CIFP 2007a 
 
National fragility trends disaggregated by 
authority, legitimacy and capacity24 
 
Authority 
In the study period, the Bolivian state proved 
able to prevail over a significant challenge to its 
authority from powerful economic and civic 
groups in the eastern and southern lowlands. A 
breakup of the Bolivian nation-state was 
avoided. A new constitution was enacted and 
pressing issues in relation to the social welfare 
and livelihoods of hitherto marginalized and 
poor, mostly indigenous sectors of the 
population, especially in the highlands, were 
addressed. This notwithstanding, the Bolivian 
state continued to exhibit a number of significant 
weaknesses, including with respect to the 
functioning of the judiciary, the persistence of 
widespread corruption and political patronage in 
a new guise, and the increase of drug-trafficking 
activity in the country. While inter-regional 
conflict has subsided, new tensions have 
                                               
24
 Based on CIFP Bolivia country report 2007b; BTI 2008, 
2010, 2012; International Crisis Group 2004, 2006, 2007a, 
2007b, 2008; UNODC, World Drug Reports 2007-2012. 
emerged involving elements of MAS’s core 
constituencies, such as indigenous farmers and 
local communities. 
 
The election of Evo Morales of the MAS party 
as Bolivia’s first president of indigenous descent 
in December 2005 marked the beginning of a 
process of significant political, economic and 
social change in South America’s poorest 
country. At the same time, the levels of 
confrontation and violent conflict between the 
new, indigenous-dominated central 
government/state in the highland capital of La 
Paz and the traditional non-indigenous political 
elites and the authorities, business associations 
and civic committees in the eastern and southern 
lowland departments (Santa Cruz, Tarija, Pando, 
Beni) first rose to dangerous levels but then 
subsided.  
 
The stand-off and deepening polarization 
between the two camps clearly limited the 
authority of the Bolivian state, especially in the 
period 2006-2009. It is important to note, 
however, that the state’s authority had already 
been severely constrained prior to 2006 due to 
the exclusionary nature of the political system 
and policy-making processes since Bolivia’s 
return to civilian-electoral rule in the early 1980s 
and the mounting contestation of this state of 
affairs by indigenous social movements, trade 
unions and the powerful coca-grower federations 
of the Chapare region near Cochabamba led by 
Morales. In 2003 and 2005, Bolivia saw the 
forced ouster of Presidents Gonzalo Sanchez de 
Lozada and Carlos Mesa, respectively. 
 
In the period 2007-2012, the Morales 
administration used the levers of state and 
indigenous social movement power to launch 
and push through a broad reform agenda. This 
agenda prominently included the 
‘nationalization’ of Bolivia’s hydrocarbon sector 
(the natural gas industry is located in the eastern 
and southern lowlands); measures to empower 
the majority indigenous population (mostly in 
the highland regions); the furthering of 
decentralization which had started in the first 
half of the 1990s; the strengthening of 
indigenous peoples’ and regional autonomies; 
the improvement of social welfare and social 
policies for the poor; the pursuit of land reform 
benefitting landless indigenous peasants; and the 
drafting of a new constitution by means of a 
Constituent Assembly. Preceded by a difficult, 
heavily contested and drawn-out drafting 
Year/score Aggregate 
fragility 
score 
Authority Legitimac
y 
Capacity 
2006 5.86 5.68 5.91 5.98 
2007 5.13 5.37 4.74 5.13 
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process, the new constitution was approved by 
referendum in January 2009 and thereupon 
enacted.  
 
Throughout the period significant state 
weaknesses persisted, such as in the judiciary 
and other parts of the state apparatus which were 
plagued by problems of access, especially for 
indigenous and rural sectors, underfunding, 
corruption, inefficiency, and political patronage 
and bureaucratic infighting. Drug-trafficking also 
increased during Morales’ tenure posing a 
significant concern to the Bolivian state, though 
the government introduced novel mechanisms to 
control the cultivation of illicit coca crops in the 
Chapare region by working closely with and not 
against coca farmers. The state’s monopoly of 
the use of force was challenged by a few local 
groups, some of them armed, in the eastern 
lowlands associated with the anti-MAS 
movement for departmental autonomy, 
particularly in Santa Cruz, as well as 
transnationally-networked drug-trafficking and 
criminal organizations.  
 
The confrontation between the central 
government/state and the departmental 
governments and powerful business associations, 
civic committees and their armed spin-offs in the 
eastern lowlands reached its peak in September 
2008. Seeking autonomy from the central 
government/state non-indigenous lowlanders 
blocked access to cities and gas pipelines, 
occupied local state institutions and engaged 
state security forces and members of indigenous 
groups in violent clashes. At the height of the 
confrontation there were fears that the Bolivian 
nation-state could break apart as some radical 
lowland groups openly used secessionist rhetoric 
and did not stop short of using violence. This 
scenario, however, did not materialize.  
 
Following the enactment of the new constitution, 
the first-round election victory of Evo Morales 
(64 per cent) and the strong performance of 
MAS in the congressional polls (obtaining a two-
third majority in both chambers) in late 2009, the 
conflict between the central government/state 
and the eastern lowlands calmed down. A spate 
of new conflicts emerged, however, due to elite 
infighting within MAS and stepped up protest by 
dissenting indigenous groups, mostly peasants, 
trade unions and local communities.  
 
 
 
Legitimacy 
In the period 2007-2012, the legitimacy of the 
Bolivian government/state was first put to a 
serious test by traditional non-indigenous 
political elites and business and civic 
associations in the lowlands, but ultimately it 
was strengthened. The Morales administration’s 
push for sweeping political, economic and social 
reforms that sought to benefit previously 
marginalized and indigenous sectors of the 
population and include them in governance and 
policy processes contributed to strengthening the 
Bolivian state’s legitimacy in the eyes of those 
majority sectors.  
 
Under Morales, access to public office for 
members of indigenous groups and women 
increased significantly. Further, the 2009 
constitution enshrines a series of social rights, 
prohibits the privatization of public social 
services related to the supply of water/sewage, 
public health and social security, and foresees 
special autonomies for indigenous peoples. 
Public spending on poverty reduction and social 
welfare for the most vulnerable sectors of 
Bolivian society increased, though the inequality 
gap between indigenous and non-indigenous 
sectors did not diminish greatly. This was 
perceived favourably by formerly excluded and 
discriminated groups of impoverished 
indigenous peoples, including in rural areas 
(especially but not exclusively in the highlands), 
contributing to the approval of the new 
constitution by referendum and the re-election of 
President Morales, both by wide margins. 
President Morales’s popular approval ratings 
fluctuated during the study period but overall 
remained on the higher end. 
 
As noted above, the policies and reform course 
of the Morales administration were at first met 
with fierce resistance from traditional non-
indigenous elites and powerful groups in the 
eastern and southern lowlands. In no small 
measure this was related to deep ethnic, social 
and class cleavages that have characterized 
Bolivian society for decades and centuries; 
resistance was further propelled by the 
determination of the new government to get the 
state to work in the interest of Bolivia’s 
impoverished, indigenous masses. In this process 
the Morales government often bypassed or bent 
the formal rules of the game and exhibited strong 
traits of bias or even discrimination against 
traditional non-indigenous elites and other 
groups that did not belong to its broad base of 
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social support. Evidently, this resulted in the 
government’s and the central state’s loss of 
legitimacy in the eyes of those sectors of 
Bolivian society.  
 
Yet in keeping with a Bolivian tradition of 
averting crisis through last-minute compromise 
and negotiation the Morales administration 
proved able to find ways to avoid the emergence 
of a full-blown crisis of national proportions and 
reach compromise with the less intransigent 
elements of the political opposition. This 
gradually reduced the room for manoeuvre of the 
more radical opponents of the Morales 
government, especially in the eastern and 
southern lowlands. The opposition fragmented 
and after the enactment of the 2009 constitution 
and the re-election of President Morales key 
representatives of the regional autonomy and 
civic movements came round to accepting the 
legitimacy of the central state, if not agreeing on 
many counts with government policies. At the 
same time, growing dissent started to emerge 
from within the broad MAS constituency, 
presenting the government/state with a new 
challenge to their legitimacy. 
Capacity 
During the period 2007-2012, the Bolivian state 
was hamstrung by significant capacity deficits, 
though some improvements appear to have 
occurred over time. State capacity to provide 
basic public administration and adequate (access 
to) social services, primary and secondary 
education, justice, and employment opportunities 
has historically been limited, especially in rural 
and peri-urban areas.25 Both indigenous and non-
indigenous communities in more remote areas of 
the high and lowlands have a long history of 
self-administration and self-provision of public 
services; though it is important to recognize that 
historically the state has not been absent but 
rather played a paternalistic role as a provider 
and guarantor of jobs and subsidies for specific 
(elite) sectors of Bolivian society. 
 
The Morales government came into office 
without much previous experience in public 
administration, and some sectors of the state and 
civil service were alienated for political reasons. 
Yet there were significant government efforts to 
increase access to education for men and women 
in rural areas, especially in indigenous 
communities; to modernize and extend the 
                                               
25
 See sections on ‘state fragility in rural areas’ and ‘rural 
development’ below for more information on public services. 
coverage of the public social welfare system to 
the great majority of people who had not been 
included, particularly in rural areas; and fight 
poverty and generate employment among the 
lower-paid workers in both the formal and 
informal sectors.  
 
It remains to be seen what the impact of these 
efforts has been. There are some indications that 
persisting administrative weaknesses, short-term 
approaches to policy planning and 
implementation, corruption, and political 
influences undercut the capacity of the Bolivian 
state to deliver public services and goods across 
the country and administer the significantly 
increased funds it has had at its disposal due to 
growing national income from the export of 
natural gas in an appropriate and transparent 
manner. This has been clearly evident with 
respect to the delivery of justice which has 
suffered from limited access for ordinary, poor 
people, particularly in rural and peri-urban areas.  
 
State fragility in rural areas26 
 
The availability of data and information on state 
fragility in rural areas in Bolivia in the period 
2007-2012 is very limited. It appears that state 
fragility in rural areas, in which 23 per cent of 
the population lived in 2010 (CIA 2013), across 
the dimensions of authority, legitimacy and 
capacity has historically been broadly correlated 
to the percentage of indigenous and non-
indigenous populations in a given community. 
That is, prior to the arrival of Evo Morales and 
MAS in government state authority, legitimacy 
and capacity was lower in majority indigenous 
communities and higher in majority non-
indigenous communities. This is reflected in the 
consistently higher poverty, illiteracy and 
inequality rates in indigenous communities and 
lower levels of delivery of basic social services 
in majority indigenous communities, mostly in 
the highlands. 
 
There are some indications that this picture 
changed after 2006, when the central 
government/state started investing much more in 
indigenous majority communities in rural and 
peri-urban areas in the highlands but also in 
some parts of central Bolivia (e.g. the coca-
growing Chapare region; see below) and the 
eastern and southern lowlands. At the same time, 
                                               
26
 Based on World Bank, Country Social Analysis Bolivia,  
2006; Ledebur and Youngers 2012. 
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the authority, legitimacy and capacity of the 
central state overall appears to have declined in 
the eastern and southern lowlands, at least 
temporarily, as the Morales administration 
became locked in conflict with dominant groups 
in those regions of the country. It is an open 
question whether departmental and municipal 
state entities in the eastern and southern 
lowlands were able to compensate for this loss of 
authority, legitimacy and capacity of the central 
state in general and in rural areas in particular. 
 
With respect to the Chapare region, there are 
some indications that the change in government 
counter-drug policy had a positive impact on 
state fragility in that rural region in central 
Bolivia. President Morales introduced a 
‘cooperative coca reduction strategy’ also known 
as ‘social coca crop control strategy’ which 
‘hinges on the voluntary participation of farmers 
from all coca-growing regions in the country and 
on balancing pressures from the international 
community with the demands of its coca-
growing constituents’ (Ledebur and Youngers, 
2012: 5). At the core of this strategy is the 
consent of the coca farmers of the Chapare to 
cooperate with the central government in 
controlling and monitoring the cultivation and 
commercialization of (illicit) coca leaf. The six 
local coca grower federations play a vital role in 
enforcing the agreement, which stipulates that 
each Chapare farming family may grow one cato 
of coca (1,600 square metres), and that the 
cultivation, transit, sale and marketing of coca 
leaf is monitored by means of a biometric 
registry of coca producers.‘As a result of the cato 
agreement, the violence and conflict generated 
by forced eradication in the Chapare has, with 
rare exceptions, ceased’ (Ledebur and Youngers 
2012: 5). It may be inferred that this has helped 
bolster the authority, legitimacy and capacity of 
the Bolivian state in this particular rural area.27 
 
Rural development profile 
 
Poverty28 
 
Poverty head count for rural areas 
 It has been difficult to obtain figures for the 
entirety of our study period although data for 
                                               
27
 See Study 2 for an in-depth analysis of the coca issue in the 
Chapare and how the Morales administration’s change in 
coca policy has contributed to reducing conflict, violence and 
state fragility in this particular region.   
28
 Based on CEPAL 2007, IMF, 2009, World Bank 2005, 
2011, and other literature indicated in the text 
some of this period and immediately prior to 
2007 has been found. The following depiction of 
rural development and poverty in Bolivia 
broadly follows a multidimensional poverty 
index profile in line with some of the UN 
Human Development Indicators. According to a 
2007 CEPAL study “Bolivia has one of the 
highest poverty rates in Latin America: 78.5 per 
cent of the rural population was living in poverty 
in 1997 compared to 77.7 per cent and 76.6 per 
cent in 2001 and 2006, respectively, while the 
figures for extreme rural poverty were 61.5 per 
cent, 59.7 per cent and 62.3 per cent, 
respectively” (CEPAL, 2007). The report 
attributes these high rates of rural poverty to low 
agricultural production, and the restricted 
demand for agricultural commodities, with 
efforts at reducing poverty hampered by the 
country’s institutional fragility and the weakness 
of its public institutions (Cristobal 2011). 
 
Table 8: Poverty Levels, Bolivia, 2007 and 
2009 
*Extreme poverty denotes those living under $1 
a day. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, IMF (2009:34) 
 
The vast majority of the rural population 
employed in agriculture is poor, with the most 
recent figures estimating that 85% living in 
poverty and 75% in extreme poverty (WB, 
2011). There has, however, been a decline in the 
rural population, which in 2011 constituted 33% 
of the total population. The agricultural sector 
itself currently accounts for 13% of GDP, rising 
to 27% if agribusiness is also considered (ibid.). 
However, according to the UN Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC) the cultivation of coca has 
Poverty 
Level 
2007 2009 
Relative 
Poverty 
60.1 50.6 
Urban 50.9 43.5 
Rural 77.3 66.4 
Extreme 
Poverty* 
37.7 26.1 
Urban 23.7 16.1 
Rural 63.9 45.5 
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decreased notably by about 7% from the 2011 
figure of 27,200 hectares to the 2012 estimate of 
25,300 hectares. This confirms a downward 
trend shown in 2011 when cultivation had fallen 
12% since 2010 (UNODC, 2012).  
 
However, despite problems in the agricultural 
sector and ‘historically low’ public expenditure 
on agriculture geared mainly towards productive 
infrastructure and less on agricultural innovation 
(13% of GDP in 2008, predominantly on roads 
and rural electrification) public spending both 
nominally and in real terms has increased 
significantly on average between 2003 and 2008, 
where sub-national government spending has 
become more pronounced (WB 2011:  8).    
 
Relative food consumption 
In terms of relative food consumption, the 
extreme poor consume 60% less than the 
national average.  At the municipal level, 62% of 
municipalities were categorized in 2007 as 
having a moderate to very low vulnerability to 
food insecurity, while 38% were highly 
vulnerable to food insecurity. Again, positive 
gains were seen in the fact that the percentage of 
municipalities with high or very high levels of 
vulnerability to food insecurity decreased from 
51% in 2003 to 38% in 2007, but weak 
correlations have been shown between these 
reductions and actual agricultural spending, and 
this has been attributed to the focus on poverty 
alleviation rather than growth (WB 2011:11). 
Unfortunately, there is no food consumption data 
disaggregated in terms of female headed 
households or panel data on levels of household 
livelihood diversification.  
 
Inequalities  
Further indicators of poverty point to a very high 
net primary school enrolment rate, remaining 
constant at 94% during the whole period of 
2001-2008 (WB 2013), with  a target set of 
100% for 2015 (GoB 2010). Equally positive is 
the decreasing rate of unemployment which fell 
from 8.2% in 2005 to 5.5% in 2011 (IMF 2009), 
although it is unclear from the current data how 
this is disaggregated in terms of rural and urban 
ratios.   
         
However, indigenous inequalities are obvious 
where labour earnings that indigenous peoples 
derive from each year of schooling are lower 
than those for non-indigenous people. These 
inequalities are evident in the following 
estimates: 
Table 9: Average monthly income per 
geographic area (in Bolivianos) and language 
spoken at home 
 
Source: Gigler 2009.  
 
A 2009 study by Georgetown University found 
that “the average per-capita income of 
indigenous peoples was on average less than 
two-thirds the income of the Spanish-speaking 
population. In  terms  of  poverty  trends,  the  
data shows  that  the  poverty  gap  between 
indigenous  and  non-indigenous  people 
widened  between  1997  and  2002” (Gigler 
2009: 8). While  the poverty  rate  of  the  non-
indigenous  population declined  from  57.0 to 
52.5%, during a period of relative political 
stability during 1993 and 1999, poverty among  
indigenous  peoples  decreased  only  slightly,  
from  74.6  to  73.9%  (Jiménez  et  al. 2005 in 
Gigler 2009: 8). This  trend  is  due  to  the  sharp  
differences  between  urban  and  rural  poverty. 
The overwhelming consensus is that urban 
poverty has responded reasonably well to 
macroeconomic developments but that rural 
development has followed its own trajectory, 
where poverty remains at high levels and is 
further heavily exacerbated in rural indigenous 
areas (Klasen et al. 2004 in Gigler, 2009: 7).  
 
Service Delivery 
 
In terms of service delivery available data is 
sparse nationally, and not well disaggregated in 
term of rural and urban ratios, nor is there 
substantial material on the administration and 
process of service delivery within rural areas, 
and we can only really speculate about the 
effectiveness of service delivery organisations 
from statistical outcomes. Current figures 
available estimate that the infant mortality rate 
(per 1,000 live births) was 44 in 2007, while 
immunization against measles (% of children 
under 12-months) was 82.6% in 2006. 
Meanwhile, the maternal mortality ratio (per 
100,000 live births) was 176 in 2007, with the 
Geographic 
/Language Area 
Urban Rural Country  
as a whole 
Quechua 577 213 302 
Aymara 584 168 306 
Guarani 419 262 289 
Other Indigenous 236 243 242 
Spanish 931 373 783 
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proportion of births attended by skilled health 
personnel 65% in 2006 (IMF 2009). While 
access to portable water was possible for 75.5% 
of the population in 2007, access to improved 
sanitation facilities was available to 46.8 of the 
population in 2007. In 2010, Bolivia had 2,810 
health facilities, 8,346 trained health personal 
and it is estimated that around 54 percent of the 
medical equipment nationally is in bad shape. 
Currently, 21 percent of the child deaths under 5 
are caused by the treatable condition of 
pneumonia, while in 2008 the health budget 
represented 4.6 of expenditure (UNASUR 2012).  
 
Certainly improvements have been made in 
terms of reaching MDG targets. However, these 
figures are still relatively low by international 
standards. While not substantiating the figures in 
much detail a 2009 IMF report states that “child 
and maternal mortality rates remain high, 
especially in the rural and poor-marginal urban 
areas” and where access to water and sanitation 
services is low ( 2009: 36). 
 
The report cites World Bank data which estimate 
that only two thirds of the rural population have 
access to portable water and only 9% to 
sanitations services (ibid.).   
 
Violence Against Women 
 
The types of socio-cultural inequalities faced by 
women 
While providing minimal methodological detail 
(particularly in terms of the sample group), a 
2005 WB document which assessed gender 
relations as part a participatory rural alliances 
project found that “women were seen as 
participating in many economic activities, but as 
disadvantaged compared with the men in terms 
of decision making, control over resources, and 
access to economic benefits” (2005: 13). Further 
gender inequalities were:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Gender inequalities, Bolivia 
Source: WB 2005: 13 
 
The forms of response by public authorities  
Public policy responses to violence against 
women in Bolivia have culminated in the 2013 
adaptation of the Comprehensive Law to 
guarantee women a life free from violence in 
Bolivia (Law 348), which broadens protection of 
women against various forms of violence and 
establishes the eradication of violence against 
women as a priority of the state. Available 
figures estimate that nationally 52% of women 
reported experiencing physical violence and 14% 
reported experiencing sexual violence (Hindin et 
al. 2008), while among the Tsimane Forager-
Horticulturalists in the eastern Beni department, 
over 85% of women report being physically 
abused by their spouse, with 38% experiencing 
physical violence in the previous year (Stieglitz 
et al. 2011). It is clear that further work needs to 
be done in this area, which is more sensitive to 
rural regions, ethnicities and class differences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
More women than men are fluent only in their 
native language, and less able to negotiate in the 
market 
Illiteracy rates are higher among women 
Formal ownership of land and other assets tends 
to be in the name of men rather than women, 
making it harder for women to access credit and 
other opportunities 
Women frequently lack formal identity papers, 
making it harder for them to meet eligibility 
criteria for various development opportunities 
Women are generally more constrained than men 
in terms of available time for new activities 
Most of them are responsible for household 
activities in addition to economic activities 
Perceived negligence of their household duties 
may lead to criticism or even violence 
In some cases economic empowerment of women 
is perceived by men as a threat to their identity, 
and reactions such as violence, withdrawal and 
alcoholism are not uncommon.  
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3. Comparative conclusions: state 
fragility and rural development 
 
Comparing the presented empirical evidence29 on 
Afghanistan, DRC, Yemen, Nepal and Bolivia, 
several themes emerge that help to deepen our 
understanding of state fragility and the 
relationship between state fragility and rural 
development. As will be discussed in more detail 
below, it appears that higher levels of state 
fragility are correlated with armed conflict and 
violence. External intervention, especially if it 
has significant military, security and counter-
narcotics dimensions, can also contribute to 
exacerbating state fragility. The existence of 
parallel and traditional structures of authority 
and local institutions can both diminish the 
authority, legitimacy and capacity of states and 
compensate for the weakness or absence of the 
state, especially in rural areas. And the lack of 
consistent, legitimate and strong political 
leadership seems to enhance state fragility, 
though this appears to depend on the particular 
form in which leadership is exercised.    
 
The relationship between state fragility and rural 
development is also highly varied. Rural poverty 
rates are indeed high in all the study countries, 
but this does not necessarily correlate with their 
state fragility ranking. Consequently, with such 
poverty rates it might be argued that local forms 
of household exchange and reciprocity become 
even more central to enhancing livelihoods and 
food security in the rural areas of fragile states. 
Where information on rural service delivery does 
exist (education, health, security) levels of 
decentralisation seem to be central to the efficacy 
of their operation. The problems in the delivery 
of security and justice are no more acutely seen 
than in the police services and in the judiciary. 
This has serious implications for violence against 
women and their ability to  
seek justice in often highly volatile and violent 
contexts and where more ‘traditional’ judicial 
systems are the only recourse available, and 
which are often unwarrantably exerted.  
                                               
29
 See Annex 1 for colour-coded tables depicting fragility 
performance of the five study countries in the period 2007-
2011 (2006-2007 for Bolivia) on the basis of CIFP data; and 
Annex 2 for an overview of fragility-enhancing factors in the 
five study countries. 
3.1. Drivers and characteristics of state 
fragility in the sample countries 
 
Unsurprisingly, the existence and persistence of 
armed conflict and violence on a larger scale 
and the absence of a modicum of security have 
significant negative effects on the authority, 
legitimacy and capacity of states. The cases of 
Afghanistan and DRC - and to a lesser extent 
Yemen - show that conflict and violence increase 
the risk of serious human rights violations 
committed by state security forces (and outside 
military forces, such as ISAF in Afghanistan), 
and compound the difficulties faced by 
governments and donors to strengthen the rule of 
law and create viable and sustainable local 
economies, including in the agricultural sector. 
An escalation of violence and militarized efforts 
to control it can distort or derail well-conceived 
and well-intentioned efforts to address local 
development and governance issues, such as the 
NSP in Afghanistan. In contested regions, where 
insurgents and other armed groups have 
consistently and effectively challenged the 
state’s monopoly of force and the 
implementation of key policies, such as opium 
poppy eradication, local populations may turn to 
the rebels instead of the government and state for 
protection and the provision of basic services. 
The Taliban’s capacity to enforce order and 
compliance with certain rules and establish 
parallel governance structures in southern and 
south-eastern parts of Afghanistan gave them a 
degree of legitimacy there that both the weak 
Afghan state and ISAF lacked.    
 
In contrast, much lower levels of violence in 
Bolivia allowed the Morales government to 
increase public investment and strengthen 
governance in impoverished and marginalized 
areas of the country. This has even been the case 
in coca-growing regions like Chapare that for 
years had been the site of violent contestation 
between coca grower federations and the central 
government and state. Significant opposition in 
the eastern lowland departments to key policies 
of the central government (which also 
manifested itself in the establishment of a few 
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small armed groups in Santa Cruz department) 
and some violent clashes between central 
government supporters and members of the civic 
opposition in the lowlands had a negative impact 
on the authority, legitimacy and capacity of the 
Bolivian state in those regions of the country. 
This negative impact was temporary, however, 
because the prospects of violent confrontation 
between the central government and other key 
political actors in the high and lowlands were 
dispelled through a process, however flawed and 
difficult, of political negotiation and bargaining 
that involved the writing and promulgation of a 
new constitution.         
 
Our analysis further shows that external 
intervention can become part of the problem 
and contribute to deepening deficits foremost 
with respect to state legitimacy but also 
authority. This is particularly evident in the case 
of Afghanistan, where a very large and 
protracted external military presence (ISAF) 
managed to prop up and guarantee the survival 
of the Karzai administration but ultimately 
proved unable to establish even a modicum of 
security across the country. While the Western 
alliance made major efforts to build up a new 
national security apparatus, the Afghan army and 
police have on the whole been unable to exercise 
the monopoly of force, adding to the state’s lack 
of authority, legitimacy and capacity in large 
swaths of the national territory. This has been 
due to rampant corruption in Afghan state 
institutions, including the security forces, the 
relative military strength and political astuteness 
of the Taliban and other armed groups, the 
limited legitimacy of both Afghan and external 
security forces (related also to human rights 
violations and an elevated death toll among 
Afghan civilians because of the ‘collateral’ 
damage of the counter-insurgency war caused, 
for instance, by allied air and drone strikes), and 
the counter-narcotics campaign mostly targeting 
opium poppy farmers and their crops and less so 
the powerful trafficking networks. 
 
While an external intervention of a very different 
kind than in Afghanistan, the presence of 
sizeable contingents of UN peacekeepers in DRC 
has also not been able to prevent ongoing armed 
conflict in large eastern parts of the country, i.e. 
the two Kivu and Ituri regions. It appears that the 
problem here has not been that the very survival 
of the Kabila government depended on the 
presence and military muscle of MONUSCO, as 
with the Karzai administration and ISAF in 
Afghanistan, but rather that the UN mission has 
been instrumental in supporting the  
government’s piecemeal approach to pacifying 
the eastern regions in which human rights 
violations abounded and which has not been 
embedded in a more comprehensive strategy of 
building effective and legitimate governance at 
the central, regional and local levels. In effect, in 
some regions local traditional chiefs have 
remained outside of the control and oversight of 
the Kabila government or linked to it through 
patronage networks of limited transparency, 
fuelling violent conflicts over land and other 
assets (e.g. in the mining sector) in the eastern 
parts of DRC.               
 
Our country cases also reveal that state authority 
and capacity deficits are conditioned by the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of parallel and 
traditional structures of authority that exist 
alongside formal state institutions. This is the 
case in many (rural) areas in Afghanistan, DRC, 
Yemen and Nepal. These parallel and 
traditional/customary networks can eclipse 
formal hierarchies of state authority and in the 
process both prevent and fan conflict and 
violence at the local level. In Afghanistan, the 
central state and international donors competed 
with local traditional, customary institutions 
(jirgas, shuras, maliks and mullahs), which 
historically had been in charge of exercising 
political authority, administering justice and 
providing other public services, especially in 
rural areas. The difficulties experienced by the 
NSP show that the introduction of ‘modern’ 
governance structures in rural areas in a conflict-
affected country where the state has historically 
been absent or weak can lead to the ‘capture’ of 
those structures and funds by traditional 
authorities as well as insurgents and other armed 
groups. At the same time, in some localities a 
degree of stability and order was provided by 
traditional authorities, such as shuras in 
Afghanistan, but also armed non-state actors, 
such as the Taliban.  
 
In other settings, such as in the eastern DRC, 
local traditional, customary chiefs and 
institutions in rural areas fanned inter and intra-
communal conflicts over land and the (illegal) 
exploitation of natural resources (e.g. in the 
mining sector). In Yemen, the outcome in terms 
of providing public goods and services of a 
process of the ‘amalgamation of formal and 
informal governance systems’, driven by the 
Saleh administration as a means to extend its 
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reach and political control across the country, 
depended on the strength and legitimacy of the 
existing tribal governance structures (which were 
more consolidated in the north and weaker in the 
south). This parallel system of governance 
contributed to relative stability and relatively low 
levels of violence and repression in Yemen after 
the 1994 civil war. In Nepal, following the 
signing of the CPA in 2006 and despite the 
emergence of the Maoists as a significant 
political force political authority remained 
centralized in the hands of minority elite groups 
differentiated by caste membership and ethnicity. 
This continued the exclusion of large lower caste 
and indigenous population groups, including in 
the Tarai and other rural regions.      
 
A lack of consistent, legitimate and strong 
political leadership can enhance problems of 
state fragility, particularly with respect to deficits 
in state authority and legitimacy. Afghanistan 
under Karzai and DRC under Kabila are telling 
examples in this regard. Both Karzai and Kabila 
were unable to exercise legitimate and strong 
leadership because of widespread charges of 
electoral irregularities and fraud, the 
centralization of political power in the executive 
office (which in Afghanistan was seen as 
necessary to ensure the survival of the Karzai 
administration, while in DRC it was actually 
against the constitution), very high levels of 
official corruption and impunity, and, in the case 
of Afghanistan, heavy dependence on an external 
intervention force with its priority focus on 
counter-insurgency/anti-terrorism and counter-
narcotics strategies. Further, in both countries 
patronage networks served to bolster the power 
of those in government and inhibited the 
establishment of transparent and accountable 
governance which could reduce the vulnerability 
of large marginalized and impoverished sectors 
of the population.  
 
While on the whole less repressive and boasting 
a less tainted election record, until its downfall in 
2012 the Saleh administration exercised 
leadership by means of an intricate government-
controlled patronage network that extended from 
the capital Sana’a and was based on informal 
alliances with traditional shaiks, religious leaders 
and powerful interest groups, especially in the 
north of Yemen. Although this ‘parallel state’ 
allowed Saleh to stay in power for a long time it 
ultimately undermined official state structures 
and the legitimacy and capacity of his 
administration, adding to the Yemeni state’s 
fragility.  
 
Although certainly not without significant 
political problems and tensions, the case of 
Bolivia under Morales reveals, in turn, that 
entrenched conflicts can be prevented and 
resolved by relatively consistent, legitimate and 
strong political leadership. This is evident, for 
instance, in the much improved relationships 
between the central government and the coca 
grower federations in the Chapare region on the 
back of a more tolerant approach to coca leaf 
cultivation and its ‘social control’. Morales was 
elected by a wide margin in 2005 and re-elected 
by yet another wide margin in 2009, which 
provided him the legitimacy and political muscle 
to draft a new constitution (in what certainly was 
a very difficult political process) and prevail over 
a serious challenge to his authority and 
government from powerful groups in the eastern 
lowlands without resorting to a larger measure of 
repression and violence. Relatively well 
resourced due to high revenues from 
hydrocarbon exports, the government was also 
able to make consistent and substantial efforts to 
address deep-seated issues of discrimination, 
marginalization, inequality and poverty in rural 
majority indigenous communities. 
       
3.2. Relationships between state fragility and 
rural development  
 
Despite the data problems that have been 
discussed earlier the existing evidence does elicit 
some interesting relationships between state 
fragility – understood as deficits in state 
authority, legitimacy and capacity – and rural 
development.  
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Summary of Findings 
 
Finding 1: Extensive rural poverty is both 
related to (a) significant deficits in state 
authority, legitimacy and capacity, particularly in 
settings with violent conflict (and associated 
external interventions); and (b) persisting high 
levels of social inequality and ethnic cleavages in 
states where authority and capacity deficits are 
less pronounced. 
 
Supporting evidence: Rural poverty rates are 
variable across the sample countries, but they are 
clearly extensive in all of them, with countries 
such as Yemen and the DRC, for example, 
showing significant increases in rural poverty in 
parts of the study period and prior to it, and 
directly as a result of protracted conflict in the 
cases of Afghanistan, the DRC and Nepal. What 
is particularly arresting is the very high poverty 
rates in Bolivia, which is simultaneously the 
least fragile and violence-affected state among 
the study countries. This apparent paradox could 
indicate that higher poverty levels are not 
necessarily always correlated to higher degrees 
of state fragility and armed conflict and violence, 
but could also be related to persisting high levels 
of social inequality and ethnic cleavages. 
 
Finding 2: Social inequalities between rural and 
urban areas are related to authority and and 
capacity deficits, including the absence of strong, 
consistent and legitimate political leadership, and 
an historical urban elite bias. 
 
Supporting evidence: Significant authority and 
capacity deficits seem to have exacerbated 
existing social inequalities in rural areas in the 
study countries, with the possible exception of 
Bolivia, largely as a result of recent indigenous 
political gains under the leadership of Morales 
and MAS. However, indigenous income and 
educational levels in Bolivia still remain very 
low in comparison to the non-indigenous 
population. Across the study countries, the 
exacerbation of social inequalities may well be 
down to an historical urban elite bias, where 
social exclusion is greater, political 
representation is often institutionally and 
geographically weak and resource allocation is 
unequal.  
 
 
 
Finding 3: The provision of social welfare safety 
nets by non-state, traditional and customary 
organizations, including with respect to basic 
food security in rural areas, is related to state 
authority and capacity deficits, and deepens 
existing legitimacy deficits. 
 
Supporting evidence: Across the sample of 
countries it social welfare safety nets, 
particularly in terms of basic food security, are 
likely to be primarily provided by the more 
embedded social organizations of tribe, ethnicity, 
caste and clan rather than by the state.  While the 
data is patchy, livelihood diversification in the 
countries also seems key to household food 
security strategies either as a form of survival or 
as a strategy of accumulation and as the primary 
means of enhancing household safety nets. These 
situations have probably increased levels of 
distrust in the state, accentuating both authority 
and legitimacy deficits.  
 
Finding 4: Particularly in settings affected by 
violent conflict, deficits in state authority result 
in increased pauperization of rural populations 
due to the disruption of rural livelihoods and 
wage-labour migration. 
 
Supporting evidence: There has been an 
increased pauperization of the rural population in 
Nepal, the DRC and Afghanistan specifically in 
terms of a trend from agricultural wage-labour to 
‘casual’ non-agricultural and seasonal rural to 
urban wage-labour migration, where non-
agricultural wage labour provides even less 
household food security than agricultural wage-
labour. This can be partly explained by 
significant state authority deficits due to armed 
conflict, which disrupts livelihoods and often 
makes sustained agricultural cultivation difficult 
to undertake. 
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Finding 5:  Uncertain status of land tenure and 
land ownership in rural areas is related to deficits 
in state authority and capacity. 
 
Supporting evidence: Rural state authority and 
capacity deficits are apparent in the very 
uncertain land status within many of the sample 
countries. Conflict and unrest have given rise to 
the lack of, or impeded the growth of, formalized 
enforcement of land tenure and ownership, 
where the state has either not delivered on 
promised land reforms such as in Nepal, or 
where it has enabled the easy illegal exploitation 
of natural resources, such as in the DRC.   
 
Finding 6: Ineffective service delivery in rural 
areas is found in countries with both higher and 
lower deficits in state authority and capacity, and 
it undermines state legitimacy.. 
 
Supporting evidence: The data shows that the 
reach of the state in terms of service delivery in 
all the sample countries is on the whole weak. 
There seem to have been some improvements 
within the education sector in terms of girls’ 
school enrolment in a number of the countries, 
including Afghanistan, Yemen, Nepal and 
Bolivia, but the gender gap in these countries 
still remains high. This may be an indication that 
the decentralisation of educational services has 
been more effective in these states than in DRC.  
Overall the seemingly poor quality of service 
delivery can be explained partly in terms of 
largely ineffective decentralization amongst the 
sample countries (with the exception of 
Bolivia),particularly financial decentralization, 
such as in Yemen. This is often the case in 
developing country contexts but these 
inefficiencies in service delivery seem acutely 
apparent in the lack of formal justice systems 
within the sample fragile country contexts, 
which largely rely upon ‘traditional’ and 
customary forms of arbitration and redress, but 
which need much closer investigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finding 7:  Higher levels of violence against 
women in rural areas are possibly related to 
deficits in state authority and capacity, 
particularly because of the absence or weakness 
of formal justice institutions and the prevalence 
of traditional and customary authorities. 
 
Supporting evidence: The lack of courts and 
police services has serious implications for 
incidences of violence against women in the 
sample countries. There is some evidence to 
suggest that violence against women may be 
higher in rural areas, such as in Afghanistan, but 
this data is very tentative involving relatively 
small samples. However, we can speculate that 
the conspicuous lack of judicial institutions is 
likely to have an adverse effect on women’s 
access to justice as far as violence against them 
is concerned. In addition, the evidence shows 
that so-called ‘traditional‘ institutions and 
‘patriarchal’ cultural principles do legitimate 
some forms of violence against women, although 
this area of discussion is highly problematic in 
terms of juggling the fine line between cultural 
autonomy and policy intervention. Despite the 
formulation of legislation on violence against 
women in most of the study countries (with the 
exception of Yemen), coupled with the relative 
absence of women in public bodies across the 
selected countries, serious questions arise 
regarding the lack of increase in women’s 
authority and status and the correlations with 
violence against women within the study 
countries specifically as a result of state authority 
and capacity deficits in rural areas.  
 
Finding 8: Food insecurity in rural regions is 
significantly affected by state fragility.  
 
Supporting evidence: The available evidence 
suggests that food security is affected in all of 
the sample countries with rural populations 
generally more insecure than urban ones. This 
means that rural populations often have restricted 
or no access to sufficient nutritious food, and are 
consuming a low quality diet according to agreed 
international standards.   
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Finding 9: Agricultural prices are subject to 
significant shocks which further exacerbates 
levels of rural food insecurity.  
 
Supporting evidence: Cereal prices, particularly 
in the DRC, seem to fluctuate enormously as a 
result of civil conflict.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finding 10: Livelihood diversification in the 
countries is key to household food security 
strategies either as a form of survival or as a 
strategy of accumulation and as the primary 
means of enhancing household safety nets; this 
diversification is often dependent on illicit 
economies.  
 
Supporting evidence: Livelihood sustainability 
is increasingly dependent on non-skilled wage 
labour and seemingly on some illicit activities 
such as mining and drug production, although 
highly robust figures on the illicit activities are 
not available. 
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Annexes  
 
Annex 1: CIFP fragility scores Afghanistan, 
DRC, Yemen, Nepal and Bolivia 
 
Table 1: CIFP Fragility Scores, Afghanistan, 
2007, 2008 and 2011 
 
At the aggregate level, Afghanistan clearly 
emerges as the most fragile state among the 
group of selected countries. The country had the 
highest aggregate fragility scores (2007, 2008 
and 2011) and the third largest variation in terms 
of increasing aggregate fragility in 2007-2008 
and the highest in 2008-2011. Afghanistan’s 
record was particularly bleak with respect to 
‘authority’ (ranking highest among the five 
countries, though in terms of the variation of 
increasing authority deficit in 2007-2008 it 
ranked second and in 2008-2011 third) and 
‘capacity’ (ranking second in 2007, third in 2008 
and highest in 2011, witnessing the smallest 
variation in increasing capacity deficit in 2007-
2008 but the largest in 2008-2011).  
 
With respect to ‘legitimacy’, Afghanistan scored 
second highest in 2007, highest in 2008 and 
again second highest in 2011, experiencing the 
second largest variation in 2007-2008 and the 
third highest in 2008-2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: CIFP Fragility Scores, Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), 2007, 2008 and 
2011 
 
DRC had the second highest aggregate fragility 
scores (2007, 2008 and 2010) and the largest 
variation in terms of increasing aggregate 
fragility in 2007-2008 and the third largest 
variation in 2008-2011. The country’s record 
was particularly bleak with respect to 
‘legitimacy’, a dimension in which it scored third 
in 2007, second in 2008 and first in 2011, with a 
significant (second largest) variation in 2008-
2011. ‘Capacity’ was of concern too, with DRC 
scoring third in 2007, first in 2008 and second in 
2011, witnessing the largest variation in terms of 
an increasing authority deficit among the five 
study countries in 2007-2008. With regards to 
‘authority’, DRC scored second in 2007, second 
in 2008 and third in 2011, with the second 
largest variation regarding an increasing capacity 
deficit in 2008-2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year-
variatio
n/score 
Aggrega
te 
fragility 
score 
Authority Legitimacy Capacity 
2007 6.99 7.01 6.35 6.55 
2008 6.93 7.40 7.09 6.24 
Variatio
n: 2007-
2008 
-0.06 +0.39 +0.73 -0.31 
2011 7.54 7.54 7.25 7.36 
Variatio
n: 2008-
2011 
+0.61 +0.14 +0.14 +1.12 
Year/ 
score 
Aggregate 
fragility 
score 
Authority Legitimac
y 
Capacity 
2007 6.50 6.91 6.15 6.33 
2008 6.91 7.12 6.56 6.76 
Variation: 
2007-2008 
+0.41 +0.21 +0.41 +0.43 
2011 7.10 7.31 7.40 6.72 
Variation: 
2008-2011 
+0.19 +0.19 +0.84 -0.04 
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Table 3: CIFP Fragility Scores, Yemen, 2007, 
2008 and 2011 
 
Yemen had the third highest aggregate fragility 
score in 2007, the fourth highest in 2008 and the 
third highest in 2011, with the second largest 
variation in terms of increasing aggregate 
fragility in 2008-2011. The country had the 
highest score on ‘legitimacy’ in 2007, but then 
witnessed a significant improvement scoring 
fourth in 2008 and third in 2011, with the largest 
variation in the decrease of its legitimacy deficit 
in 2007-2008 which was followed, however, by 
the largest variation regarding an increasing 
legitimacy deficit in 2008-2011. Regarding 
‘capacity’ Yemen scored first in 2007, second in 
2008 and third in 2011, witnessing and 
increasing capacity deficit over the period, with 
the third largest variation in 2007-2008 and the 
second largest variation in 2008-2011. Regarding 
its ‘authority’ deficit Yemen scored fourth in 
2007 and 2008 and second in 2011, witnessing a 
significant increase in its authority deficit with 
the largest variation between the study countries 
in 2008-2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: CIFP Fragility Scores, Nepal, 2007, 
2008 and 2009/2011 
 
Nepal had the fourth highest aggregate fragility 
score in 2007 and the third highest in 2008, with 
the second largest variation in terms of 
increasing aggregate fragility in 2007-2008. No 
aggregate fragility data was available for 2011. 
Regarding the country’s ‘authority’ deficit, 
Nepal scored third in 2007 and fourth in 2011, 
experiencing, however, the highest variation 
among the study countries in terms of an 
increasing authority deficit in 2007-2008.  
 
 Regarding Nepal’s ‘legitimacy’ and ‘capacity’ 
deficits, it scored fourth on both counts in 2007 
and third and fourth, respectively, in 2008, 
witnessing the second largest increases in 
‘legitimacy’ and ‘capacity’ deficits from among 
the study countries. No data was available for 
2011. 
 
Table 5: CIFP Fragility Scores, Bolivia, 2006 
and 2007 
 
Year/ 
score 
Aggregate 
fragility 
score 
Authority Legitimac
y 
Capacity 
2007 6.46 5.94 7.06 6.57 
2008 6.45 6.20 6.11 6.29 
Variation: 
2007-2008 
-0.01 +0.26 -1.05 -0.28 
2011 7.0 7.38 7.24 6.62 
Variation: 
2008-2011 
+0.55 +1.18 +1.13 +0.31 
Year/ 
score 
Aggrega
te 
fragility 
score 
Authority Legitimac
y 
Capacity 
2007 6.15 6.42 5.72 6.14 
2008 6.55 7.02 6.50 6.20 
Variation: 
2007-2008 
+0.40 +0.60 +0.78 +0.06 
2009 6.20 6.64 
(2011) 
n/a n/a 
Variation: 
2008-
2009/2011 
-0.35 -0.38   
Year/ 
score 
Aggregate 
fragility 
score 
Authority Legitimac
y 
Capacity 
2006 5.86 5.68 5.91 5.98 
2007 5.13 5.37 4.74 5.13 
Variation -0.73 -0.31 -1.17 -0.85 
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Bolivia is clearly the outlier among the country 
cases selected for this study. It is the only 
country that witnessed a significant decrease in 
state fragility, both at the aggregate level and 
across the dimensions of ‘authority’, ‘legitimacy’ 
and ‘capacity’, in the period 2006-2007. No 
CIFP data was available for other years in the 
study period. In 2006-2007, Bolivia witnessed a 
significant decrease in fragility with respect to its 
‘legitimacy’ deficit, followed by a decrease in 
‘capacity’ deficit and, finally, a decrease in its 
‘authority’ deficit. 
 
Colour code: Red - highest; Green - second 
highest; Aquamarine - third highest; Yellow - 
fourth highest; Grey - lowest 
 
 
 
 
Annex 2: Overview of fragility factors in study countries30 
 
Fragility 
factor/country 
Afghanistan DRC Yemen Nepal Bolivia 
Internal armed 
conflict and violence 
situations 
X (high) X (high) X (medium) X (low)  
Negotiated peace 
agreement 
 X (2002 and 
subsequent 
agreements, have 
not held up) 
 X (2006 
agreement, has 
held up) 
 
No state monopoly 
on the use of force 
X (national 
and regional 
insurgencies, 
warlords, large 
international 
military 
presence) 
X (regional 
insurgencies and 
sizable UN 
force) 
X (regional 
insurgencies, Al 
Qaeda, no UN 
force) 
  
Modicum of state 
monopoly of the use 
of force 
   X (pockets of 
armed 
insurgency, 
organized crime 
in Tarai) 
X (very small 
pockets of armed 
resistance, some 
organized crime 
in eastern 
lowlands) 
Decentralization   X  X 
Dysfunctional 
formal justice 
system 
X X X X (less than in 
A, DRC, Y) 
X (less  than A, 
DRC, Y, N) 
Serious and regular 
human rights 
violations 
X (high) X (very high) X (high) X (medium) X (low) 
Functional 
traditional customary 
justice systems 
X X X X (less than in 
A, DRC, Y) 
 
Significant 
patronage 
networks/rule 
X X X X (less than in 
A, DRC, Y due 
to Maoists) 
 
Strong tribal, ethnic, 
caste identities and 
traditional 
authorities 
X X X (esp. in north) X X (less strong 
than in A, DRC, 
Y, N) 
                                               
30
 This list of factors is indicative, not exhaustive. It is derived from the empirical fragility profiles presented in this study. 
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 Corruption X (very high) X (very high) X (high) X (high) X (high) 
Election fraud X X    
Majority rural 
populations 
X (76.5%) X (65.7%) X (67.7%) X (83%)  
Majority urban 
populations 
    X (67%) 
Large illicit (rural) 
economies 
X X (illegal 
mining) 
  X 
No large illicit 
(rural) economies 
  X X  
High rural authority 
deficit 
X X X (esp. south and 
some northern 
areas) 
X (esp. Tarai)  
Low rural authority 
deficit 
    X 
High rural 
legitimacy deficit 
X X X (esp. south, 
some northern 
areas) 
X (esp. Tarai)  
Low rural legitimacy 
deficit 
    X (exception: 
some areas in 
east) 
High rural capacity 
deficit 
X X X X (esp. Tarai) X (eastern and 
southern 
departments) 
Low rural capacity 
deficit 
    X (highlands) 
 
 
The table indicates that high levels of state 
fragility in Afghanistan, DRC and Yemen (in 
order of significance) are correlated to the 
following ‘fragility factors’: 
 
 Existence of internal armed conflict and 
high levels of violence, and presence of 
outside military forces 
 
 Absence of a peace process and/or 
negotiated peace agreement that would 
have held up 
 
 No or a severely limited state monopoly of 
the use of force due to existence of national 
and regional insurgencies, warlords, 
international terrorist organizations and the 
presence of large outside military forces 
(e.g. ISAF in Afghanistan and UN forces 
in DRC) 
 
 Dysfunctional formal justice system 
 
 Very high and high level of seriousness 
and regularity of human rights violations 
 
 Both very high and high levels of 
corruption 
 
 Existence of functional traditional, 
customary justice systems 
 
 No or ineffective decentralization 
 
 Existence of powerful patronage networks 
and rule 
 
 Strong tribal, ethnic and /or caste identities 
and traditional authorities  
 
 Both fraudulent and/or chaotic electoral 
processes and relatively clean, fair and 
regular electoral processes 
 
 Large majority rural populations 
 
 Conversely, lower levels of state fragility, 
such as in Nepal and Bolivia, appear to be 
correlated to the following factors: 
 
 Absence or low level of internal armed 
conflict and violence, no outside military 
presence 
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 Existence of a peace agreement which has 
held up 
 
 Modicum of state monopoly of the use of 
force, with only relatively small pockets of 
armed insurgency and political opposition 
and/or organized criminal groups in 
specific regions of the country 
 
 A somewhat less dysfunctional formal 
justice system  
 
 Medium to low level of seriousness and 
regularity of human rights violations 
 
 Lower levels of corruption 
 
 Both significant and less significant 
functional traditional, customary justice 
systems  
 
 Both no decentralization and effective 
decentralization 
 
 No or less powerful patronage 
networks/rule 
 
 Strong tribal, ethnic and /or caste identities 
and traditional political authorities 
 
 Relatively clean, fair and regular electoral 
processes  
 
 Both majority urban and majority rural 
populations  
 
Comparing the more fragile countries 
(Afghanistan, DRC and Yemen) with the less 
fragile ones (Nepal and Bolivia) reveals that the 
factor ‘strong tribal, ethnic and/or caste identities 
and traditional authorities’ does not appear to 
have an effect on the level of state fragility for it 
applies to both groups of countries.  
Furthermore, comparison shows that ‘quality of 
elections’, ‘degree of significance of functional, 
customary justice systems’, ‘degree of 
effectiveness of decentralization’, and ‘relative 
size of urban and rural populations’ can have an 
effect on state fragility that goes both ways, 
either increasing or reducing it.  
 
The primary factors that could explain 
differences in the level of state fragility therefore 
are:  
 
 Internal armed conflict and high levels of 
violence 
 
 Presence of outside military forces 
 
 Existence/absence of peace process and/or 
negotiated peace agreement that holds up 
 
 Quality and reach of the state monopoly of 
the use of force 
 
 Quality and effectiveness of formal justice 
system 
 
 Very high/high levels of seriousness and 
regularity of human rights violations 
 
 High levels of corruption 
 
 Existence of powerful patronage networks 
and rule 
 
Under certain circumstances, the above 
mentioned additional, secondary factors may 
also apply, i.e. ‘quality of elections’; ‘high levels 
of corruption’; ‘degree of significance of 
functional, customary justice systems’; ‘degree 
of effectiveness of decentralization’; and 
‘relative size of urban and rural populations’.  
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